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THE ESSENCE OF ANTITRUST:  PROTECTING 
CONSUMERS AND SMALL SUPPLIERS FROM 
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT 
John B. Kirkwood* 
 
The goals of antitrust law continue to be debated because there is no 
single goal that is unambiguously correct.  There is one goal, however, that 
now commands wider support than any other:  protecting consumers and 
small suppliers from anticompetitive conduct—conduct that creates market 
power, transfers wealth from consumers or small suppliers, and fails to 
provide them with compensating benefits.  This goal is the predominant 
objective in the legislative histories, it is broadly supported by the 
American people, it is easier to administer than a total welfare standard, 
and it is now espoused by the majority of courts. 
Proponents of total welfare advance two principal arguments, but neither 
warrants elevating it over consumer and small supplier protection.  First, 
from a normative perspective, total welfare is arguably the superior goal 
because it considers the welfare of all participants in the economy, 
including producers and consumers outside the relevant market.  It ignores, 
however, the transfer of wealth that anticompetitive conduct causes, a 
transfer that many people regard as exploitative and unfair.  Second, from 
a legal perspective, total welfare is arguably the goal of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, because it allows a firm to gain monopoly power through 
superior efficiency.  But this safe harbor is equally consistent with a 
consumer protection goal, since it encourages firms to succeed in the 
marketplace by providing customers with better products, lower prices, and 
more choices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Everyone is a consumer, and the most egregious form of anticompetitive 
behavior—hardcore price fixing—harms consumers without justification.  
It raises the prices they pay, transfers their wealth to the conspirators, and 
rarely, if ever, has redeeming virtues.  The most basic purpose of antitrust 
law is to protect consumers from such behavior.  A closely related goal is to 
protect small suppliers like farmers and ranchers from price fixing by large 
buyers.  When buyers with market power agree to depress the prices they 
pay small, competitive suppliers, they exploit them in the same way that 
colluding sellers exploit consumers.  They take the suppliers’ wealth 
without providing them with countervailing benefits. 
Price fixing, however, lies at the core of antitrust law and is easy to 
condemn from a variety of perspectives.  Even if the ultimate objective of 
antitrust law were not to protect consumers and small suppliers from 
exploitation but to protect the economy from conduct that reduces the total 
wealth or satisfaction it generates, hardcore price fixing would still be 
condemned.  By raising the prices that consumers pay or lowering the 
prices that suppliers receive, it depresses output, distorts resource 
allocation, and reduces aggregate welfare.  Alternatively, if antitrust is 
ultimately directed at the concentration of power in society, price fixing 
would also be troubling because it increases the economic power of the 
conspirators. 
Other forms of business behavior, however, are more difficult to evaluate 
and require choices among goals.  A merger of competing sellers that 
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results in somewhat higher prices but significantly lower production costs 
would harm consumers and increase the concentration of economic power, 
but it would also improve total welfare, since it would enhance productive 
efficiency more than it distorts allocative efficiency.1  Similarly, a dominant 
firm that cuts prices to achieve greater economies of scale would benefit 
both consumers and economic efficiency in the short run.  But in the long 
run, there may be a conflict between total welfare and the welfare of 
consumers.  If the dominant firm gains a monopoly that does not erode 
quickly, consumers may be harmed on balance, but total welfare may rise 
because of the long-term decline in production costs.2 
The debate about antitrust goals is a debate about how to evaluate such 
tradeoffs.3  It is not possible to avoid this debate by resorting to the 
proposition that the purpose of antitrust is to preserve competition or protect 
the competitive process.  Those terms are not self-defining, they were not 
defined by Congress,4 and they cannot be used to evaluate behavior with 
mixed effects without specifying either the effect or effects that should 
count or the legal rules or standards that should be applied in making the 
determination—a decision that itself implies a judgment about which 
effects deserve the greatest weight or which behavior deserves 
condemnation.  One way or another, the goals issue must be addressed.5 
 
 1. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra note 133 and accompanying text; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2474 (2013) (other 
practices that may present a conflict between consumer welfare and total welfare include 
“joint ventures with some integrative function, mergers, many unilateral practices, and at 
least a few vertical practices, including some instances of resale price maintenance, 
exclusive dealing, and tying.  What these practices have in common is that under the right 
circumstances they can serve as an opportunity for exercising market power, but they can 
also produce considerable efficiencies.”). 
 3. Many commentators have recognized the importance of these tradeoffs. See, e.g., 
Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 343, 354 n.26 
(2011) (“It is widely accepted that the difference between the two views [total welfare and 
consumer welfare] is important in certain settings, such as mergers.”); Alan J. Meese, 
Reframing the (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare and Total Welfare, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2197, 2210 (2013) (“[T]he choice between [purchaser welfare and total welfare] will 
have important implications for public and private enforcement, particularly when viewed 
through the lens of the optimal deterrence model.”); Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust 
Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 133, 164 (2010) (“The differences 
between the total surplus standard and consumer-oriented standards are substantial.”). 
 4. 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 101 (rev. ed. 1997) (“The members of 
Congress who enacted the Sherman Act wanted to preserve ‘competition,’ although they 
never defined that term . . . .”).  Nor did Congress define any of the other key terms in the 
principal antitrust laws, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, such as “restraint of trade” or 
“monopolize.”  Likewise, in the Federal Trade Commission Act, passed in the same year as 
the Clayton Act, Congress did not define “unfair methods of competition.” 
 5. See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly 
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 436–37 n.104 (2009) (“But what does the 
‘competitive process’ mean?  It cannot turn on whether the process involves more 
competitors or more competitive behavior among them, for antitrust law allows mergers that 
reduce the number of competitors and joint ventures that limit competitive behavior if they 
benefit consumer welfare . . . .  Nor can it turn on a combination of those factors and conduct 
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The debate about antitrust goals persists because there is no 
unambiguously correct way to choose among them.  As a purely normative 
matter, it is not obvious that consumer protection is a superior goal to 
economic efficiency—that the welfare of consumers must trump the welfare 
of society.  Nor is it possible to read the legislative histories of the antitrust 
laws or the cases interpreting them and identify a single goal that must be 
pursued to the exclusion of all others.  Nevertheless, it is possible to discern 
a dominant goal, a goal that has wider support than any other in the sources 
most often relied on—the legislative history, the case law, the preferences 
of the American people, and the ease of administration. 
Those sources are worth examining despite the views of some Justices 
and scholars that legislative interpretation should be based exclusively on 
the original meaning of the statutory text.6  In the case of the principal 
antitrust laws, the critical terms were not defined,7 and Congress did not 
specify in the statutes or indicate in the legislative histories that courts were 
to give to these terms the meaning they had in the common law.8  This does 
not imply that there is no value in looking at the words that Congress 
chose.9  But it does suggest that a more reliable guide to what Congress 
wanted to achieve is contained in the legislative discussions and debates.  
The case law is also important because Congress expected the courts to play 
a major role in interpreting the broad terms it used in the antitrust laws.10  
 
efficiency, for antitrust law . . . prohibits efficient mergers that reduce the number of rivals 
but harm consumer welfare.  Instead, as this legal pattern shows, courts judge whether 
conduct worsens the competitive process by whether it produces a process that is likely to 
harm consumer welfare.”); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 551, 569 (2012) (the competitive process fails as an antitrust goal because “it simply 
shifts the debate to a larger, unresolved issue, namely defining an ‘effective competitive 
process’”). 
 6. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW (1997); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012). 
 7. See supra note 4. 
 8. To the contrary, Justice Scalia himself declared that “restraint of trade” was not to be 
given the meaning it had in the common law of 1890. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. 
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (“The Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ 
along with its dynamic potential.  It invokes the common law itself and not merely the static 
content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”); id. at 731 (“The changing 
content of the term ‘restraint of trade’ was well recognized at the time the Sherman Act was 
enacted.”); see also Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406 
(1911) (“With respect to contracts in restraint of trade, the earlier doctrine of the common 
law has been substantially modified . . . .”). 
 9. Indeed, Professor Lande has found contemporaneous dictionaries, treatises, and 
cases that define or interpret the terms in the principal antitrust laws.  While limited in 
number, these materials consistently indicate that Congress intended to prohibit behavior that 
reduced output, raised prices, or otherwise restricted consumer choice, without regard 
for whether it increased economic efficiency.  “Monopolize,” for example, meant to use 
conduct that resulted in monopoly power, even if the conduct simply reflected the firm’s 
superior efficiency. See Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals 
of Antitrust:  Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349, 2376 (2013). 
 10. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 
326 U.S. 1 (1945) (in the Sherman Act, Congress had “delegated to the courts the duty of 
 2013] THE ESSENCE OF ANTITRUST 2429 
Moreover, popular support is relevant because it provides the basis for the 
continued existence of the antitrust laws and the funding that makes 
antitrust enforcement possible.  If the antitrust laws were consistently 
applied in ways that the public—and their congressional representatives—
opposed, the funding for enforcement would be cut and the laws themselves 
amended or repealed.  Finally, ease of administration needs to be 
considered because any antitrust goal must be implemented, and when 
implementation is more costly and complex, enforcement and litigation will 
be more expensive, business planning will be more difficult, and the value 
of antitrust as a deterrent—its most important value—will be reduced. 
These sources of meaning indicate that the goal with the widest 
support—the most fundamental goal—is the protection of consumers from 
anticompetitive conduct—conduct that creates market power, transfers 
wealth from consumers to producers, and fails to provide consumers with 
compensating benefits.  In a buy-side case, when suppliers are the victims 
of anticompetitive conduct, the overarching goal is analogous:  to stop 
conduct that creates market power on the buying side, transfers wealth from 
suppliers to buyers, and does not provide suppliers with offsetting 
benefits.11  In short, whether practiced by buyers or sellers, conduct that 
creates market power, transfers wealth, and fails to provide compensating 
benefits is conduct that reduces competition and distorts the competitive 
process. 
The legislative histories of the principal antitrust laws express more 
support for this goal than for any other.  Many senators and congressmen 
objected to price fixing and other forms of anticompetitive behavior 
because it exploited consumers or small suppliers.  A number of 
representatives described this exploitation as a form of robbery or extortion, 
where the source of the coercion was not a gun or a club but market power.  
Never did a member of Congress indicate that such exploitation could be 
 
fixing the standard for each case”); Douglas H. Ginsburg, An Introduction to Bork (1966), 
2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 225, 225 (2006) (“The open-textured nature of the [Sherman] 
Act—not unlike a general principle of common law—vests the judiciary with considerable 
responsibility for interpretation . . . .”). 
 11. In buy-side cases, the victims of anticompetitive conduct are often individual 
suppliers like farmers, ranchers, and timber owners—small suppliers who ordinarily lack 
market power and can be exploited by a buyer or group of buyers with monopsony power.  
As shown below, both the legislative history of the Sherman Act and the case law indicate 
that Congress wanted to protect such small suppliers from anticompetitive conduct.  Of 
course, suppliers need not be individuals or small firms in order to be vulnerable to 
monopsonistic exploitation.  They may be large firms so long as they compete intensely with 
each other and price approximately at marginal cost.  If, instead, suppliers possess market 
power and price significantly above marginal cost, the analysis is more complicated.  In that 
case, the suppliers—and consumers—may still be harmed by buyer power, but such power is 
not textbook monopsony power; it is countervailing power and its effects can be 
procompetitive or anticompetitive.  For an analysis of the types of buyer power and their 
consequences, see generally John B. Kirkwood, Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement, 
92 B.U. L. REV. 1485 (2012).  For simplicity, this Article will focus on the concern most 
evident in the legislative history and case law:  protecting small, powerless suppliers from 
exploitation by buyers with monopsony power. 
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excused by an increase in economic efficiency—that a combination of 
competitors that resulted in higher prices could be justified if it achieved a 
significant reduction in production costs.  At the same time, Congress 
wanted to protect firms that succeeded in the marketplace by offering better 
products or, through their superior efficiency, lower prices.  This solicitude 
for superior performance—for competition on the merits—also suggests a 
focus on the interests of consumers, since firms succeed in the marketplace 
by offering consumers what they want. 
In recent years, the case law has largely adopted the same focus.  While 
earlier decisions expressed support for other goals, including preserving 
unconcentrated market structures and promoting economic efficiency, by 
the 1990s most courts had embraced consumer protection and, in buy-side 
cases, small supplier protection.  Today, as Part I.B explains, when judges 
address the goals of the antitrust laws in a sell-side case or define critical 
terms like “anticompetitive,” they ordinarily say that their aim is to prevent 
injury to consumers, not to enhance total welfare.  More importantly, when 
they address a conflict between these two goals, they always choose 
consumers.  No court has allowed behavior found likely to harm consumers 
in the relevant market on the ground that it would enhance economic 
efficiency.  Concern with the overall concentration of power in the 
economy or with the preservation of small business has almost entirely 
disappeared.12 
 
 12. In one area of antitrust law, secondary line Robinson-Patman Act enforcement, the 
protection of small business remains the principal goal. See John B. Kirkwood, The 
Robinson-Patman Act and Consumer Welfare:  Has Volvo Reconciled Them? 30 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 349, 349–51 (2007).  In primary line Robinson-Patman cases—cases in which the 
plaintiff is a competitor of the discriminating seller—the Supreme Court has insisted that the 
plaintiff show injury to market-wide competition. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993).  But in secondary line cases—cases in 
which the plaintiff is a customer of the discriminating seller—the Court has retained the 
traditional requirements for proving competitive injury.  In essence, these requirements 
allow a plaintiff to establish competitive injury by showing that the sellers’ discrimination 
conferred an advantage on another customer that enabled it, when competing for the business 
of downstream purchasers, to take substantial sales or profits from the plaintiff. See 
Kirkwood, supra, at 349–50 & n.4.  In its most recent Robinson-Patman case, Volvo Trucks 
N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006), the Court reiterated these 
requirements. See id. at 177.  It ruled for the defendant because the plaintiff could not satisfy 
them. See id. at 180 (finding that the plaintiff “did not establish that it was disfavored vis-à-
vis other Volvo dealers in the rare instances in which they competed for the same sale—let 
alone that the alleged discrimination was substantial”). 
  The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to broaden the reach of the Act.  The 
Court made clear, as it had before, that it would not adopt a new, more expansive 
interpretation of the Act unless that interpretation promoted market-wide competition. See 
id. at 180–81; Kirkwood, supra, at 372–74.  Since Volvo’s conduct involved “selective price 
discounting” that “fosters competition among suppliers of different brands,” the Court would 
not adopt a construction of the Act that condemned it. Volvo, 546 U.S. at 181  Thus, when 
the Court turned to market-wide competition, it focused on the impact of Volvo’s behavior 
on customers, not competitors, a focus that is now typical of recent judicial opinions under 
the other antitrust laws. See infra Part I.B.  But when the Court laid out the traditional 
prerequisites to secondary line liability, it reaffirmed the protectionist thrust of the Act. 
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Popular support for antitrust enforcement rests on the same basis.  
Everyone in the country is a consumer and no one likes to pay artificially 
high prices for goods and services.  Moreover, even when they are not the 
victims, many people think that such exploitation is wrong.  According to 
survey data, large majorities believe it is unfair for a firm to take advantage 
of unearned market power to impose losses on its customers.  People who 
hold this belief would want a legal system that protected consumers from 
illegitimate market power—market power that did not provide them with 
offsetting benefits.  It is also understandable that most people would be 
more concerned about anticompetitive exploitation than economic 
inefficiency, since the transfer of wealth caused by supracompetitive pricing 
is typically much greater than the resulting allocative inefficiency or 
deadweight loss.13  Finally, there is apparently no evidence that the 
American people would approve of a merger that raised prices so long as it 
increased economic efficiency.14 
It is also easier to administer the antitrust laws if their overarching goal in 
a sell-side case is consumer protection rather than total welfare.  Consumer 
interests vary, of course, and it is not always easy to determine the overall 
impact of a practice on consumers.  But whatever the difficulties, they are 
less than the problems presented by a total welfare standard, which requires 
assessing the effects of a practice on both consumers and producers, and 
 
  That thrust has brought the Robinson-Patman Act into considerable disfavor. See, 
e.g., Volvo, 546 U.S. at 187 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the mission of the Act “may 
well merit Judge Bork’s characterization as ‘wholly mistaken economic theory’” (citing 
ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 382 (1978))).  As a result, the Federal Trade 
Commission, once the prime enforcer of the Act, has almost entirely abandoned the field. 
See David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and 
the Goals of Competition Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2163, 2170–71 (2013).  Because the 
Act is now plainly outside the mainstream of antitrust law, it will not be discussed further in 
this Article. 
 13. In the case of cartels, for example, Connor and Lande estimate, based on a large 
sample and an extensive literature review, that the transfer is many times greater than the 
deadweight loss. John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels As Rational Business 
Strategy:  Crime Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 459 (2012) (“[T]he allocative inefficiency 
associated with cartelization is between $3 and $20 for every $100 in cartel overcharges 
. . . .”). 
 14. If there were support for such consumer-harming but efficiency-enhancing 
combinations, stories like this might appear in the The Wall Street Journal: 
The FTC announced today that it will not challenge a proposed joint venture of the 
only five producers of type-ZZ insulin.  A study by the Commission’s Bureau of 
Economics found that the joint venture will enable the producers to reduce their 
manufacturing costs by 1%.  The study further found that the producers plan to 
increase the price of type-ZZ insulin by 300%.  However, in the opinion of the 
Commission’s economists, this price increase will not reduce the overall usage of 
type-ZZ insulin significantly.  Therefore, the Commission concluded, society as a 
whole will be better off by permitting the joint venture.  The stockholders of the 
drug companies in the venture will gain more than vaccine customers will lose.  In 
the Commission’s view, Section 5 of the FTC Act should not be used to prevent 
such efficient joint ventures despite these large price increases. 
Steven C. Salop, Question:  What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?  
Answer:  The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 340–41 
n.14 (2010). 
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evaluating the net impact.  To be sure, when a bright line rule can be 
applied, ultimate goals do not affect the administrability of the law.  But 
bright line rules are not always appropriate, and when courts and agencies 
must instead assess the impact of a practice in order to determine its 
legality, the task is likely to be simpler and less costly when the ultimate 
question is the impact on consumers in the relevant market rather than on 
economic efficiency.15 
In sum, there is widespread support for the view that the fundamental 
goal of antitrust is consumer protection in a sell-side case and small 
supplier protection in a buy-side case.  Those who believe that the 
preeminent goal should instead be total welfare advance two principal 
arguments.  First, they assert, total welfare is a superior normative goal.  
After all, total welfare measures the welfare of the entire society, not just a 
component of it, and if total welfare improves, then, in principle, all the 
components of it, including consumers, can be made better off.  In practice, 
however, consumers who pay higher prices as a result of anticompetitive 
conduct are not compensated by the producers who gain from it.  Moreover, 
as just noted, many people object to behavior that exploits consumers or 
small suppliers without providing them with offsetting benefits.  This desire 
to protect consumers and small suppliers from anticompetitive conduct is 
itself an element of total welfare, since it represents a “taste” or preference 
for fairness.  But it also represents an independent normative judgment 
about the kind of society that many people want to have. 
The second objection follows from the basic antitrust principle that a firm 
may gain monopoly power through superior efficiency.  This principle, 
reflected in the legislative history and adopted by the cases, would allow a 
firm with a cost advantage to drive out all of its rivals and then charge 
monopoly prices for a substantial period of time, a result that may increase 
total welfare but reduce the welfare of consumers.  Some have argued from 
this possibility, as well as from other considerations, that the purpose of 
section 2 of the Sherman Act, unlike the purpose of section 1, is to promote 
 
 15. As Part I.C explains, when the seller does not deal directly with final consumers, the 
focus of the inquiry ought to be on consumers in the relevant market (direct purchasers), not 
final consumers, even if the direct purchasers are businesses.  Impact on direct purchasers is 
both easier to assess and a reasonable proxy for impact on final consumers.  If direct 
purchasers face an unjustified price increase, final consumers are likely to be hurt as well.  
Some cases implicitly recognize this, phrasing the goal of antitrust in terms of protecting 
customers, purchasers, or buyers rather than consumers. See Associated Gen. Contractors of 
Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983) (“As the legislative 
history shows, the Sherman Act was enacted to assure customers the benefits of price 
competition.”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(“[T]he very purpose of antitrust law is to ensure that the benefits of competition flow to 
purchasers of goods affected by the violation . . . .” (quoting In re Cardizem CD Antitrust 
Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 651 (E.D. Mich. 2000))); see also Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United 
Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489 (1968) (“As long as the seller continues to charge the 
illegal price, he takes from the buyer more than the law allows.”). 
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total welfare.16  One can explain the safe harbor for superior performance, 
however, without concluding that Congress adopted a different goal in 
section 2.  This safe harbor also serves consumer interests—by creating 
incentives to develop cheaper production processes or better products, 
thereby enabling firms to lower prices or expand consumer choice—and 
courts have increasingly justified the safe harbor on this ground.  While the 
safe harbor may not always promote consumer interests, it is likely to do so 
most of the time, and there is no obvious legal principle that would better 
serve consumers.17 
In Part I of this Article, I describe the support for the view that the pre-
eminent goal of antitrust law is protecting consumers and small suppliers 
from anticompetitive conduct.  In Part II, I examine a number of objections 
to this approach. 
I.  SUPPORT FOR CONSUMER AND SMALL SUPPLIER PROTECTION 
Protecting consumers from anticompetitive conduct—conduct that 
creates market power, transfers wealth, and fails to provide compensating 
benefits—is the antitrust goal with the widest support.  It is the predominant 
goal in the legislative histories of the principal antitrust laws, it is the 
objective that is most often endorsed by courts today, it best explains the 
current popular and political backing for antitrust enforcement, and it is 
easier to administer than total welfare.  In buy-side cases, the parallel 
goal—protecting small suppliers from anticompetitive conduct—also has 
the most support, although since buy-side cases are much less common than 
sell-side cases, it has received considerably less attention. 
A.  Legislative History 
Many authors have reviewed the legislative histories of the principal 
antitrust laws, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, or the historical 
context in which these laws were enacted.18  These inquiries have shown 
that Congress did not have a single objective in mind when it passed the 
major antitrust laws.  The members of Congress who advocated antitrust 
 
 16. See generally Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 
of the Sherman Act:  How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We 
Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010). 
 17. As the reference to consumer choice indicates, the nonprice dimensions of 
competition may be at least as important in particular markets as the price dimensions.  For 
articles emphasizing this point, see, for example, Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, 
Consumer Sovereignty:  A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 
ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997); Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer 
Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007); Lande, supra note 9. 
 18. For citations to nineteen of these studies, as well as to the legislative histories 
themselves, see 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 101 n.1.  The best known reviews 
are Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:  
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982), and ROBERT BORK, 
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978), which is based on but ultimately diverges from, Robert 
Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966), as I 
note below. 
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legislation did so in order to advance a range of goals, from curbing the 
political and social power of the trusts to encouraging firms to develop 
better products.  One objective, however, predominated over all the others:  
protecting consumers from overcharges—the higher prices made possible 
by anticompetitive conduct.  As numerous scholars have recognized, 
Congress’s fundamental goal was to prevent firms from gaining market 
power through anticompetitive means—combining rivals into trusts, for 
example, or driving out competitors through predation—and then using that 
power to charge higher prices, transferring wealth from consumers to the 
perpetrators of the conduct.19  Congress also intended to stop buyers from 
engaging in similar anticompetitive behavior in order to exploit small 
sellers like farmers and ranchers.20 
Senator Sherman, for example, called overcharges “extortion which 
makes the people poor” and “extorted wealth.”21  He stated: 
The sole object of such a combination is to make competition impossible. 
It can control the market, raise or lower prices, as will best promote its 
selfish interests. . . .  Its governing motive is to increase the profits of the 
parties composing it.  The law of selfishness, uncontrolled by 
competition, compels it to disregard the interest of the consumer. . . .  
Such a combination is far more dangerous than any heretofore invented, 
and, when it embraces the great body of all the corporations engaged in a 
particular industry in all of the States of the Union, it tends to advance the 
price to the consumer of any article produced . . . .22 
 
 19. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:  PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 2 
(2005) (“[The] only articulated goal of the antitrust laws is to benefit consumers.”); HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 50 (3d ed. 2005) (“[T]he primary intent of the 
Sherman Act’s framer was . . . the distributive goal of preventing monopolists from 
transferring wealth away from consumers.”); id. at 76 (“[T]he legislative history of the 
Sherman Act shows a great deal of concern for the fact that monopolists transfer wealth 
away from consumers, but no concern at all for any articulated concept of efficiency.”); 
Phillip Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 536 (1983) 
(“The perfectly discriminating cartel is taking from some people and giving to other people 
more than competition would.  I regard this as an anticompetitive distortion.  ‘Consumer 
welfare’ embraces what individual consumers are entitled to expect from a competitive 
economy.  If the efficiency extremists insist that only their definition of consumer welfare is 
recognized by economists, we would answer that ours is clearly recognized by the statutes.  
The legislative history of the Sherman Act is not clear on much, but it is clear on this.”); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1702–03 (1986) 
(noting that when Senator Sherman and others “protested the Sugar Trust and other 
malefactors,” their principal concern was high consumer prices and that the “choice they saw 
was between leaving consumers at the mercy of trusts and authorizing the judges to protect 
consumers.  However you slice the legislative history, the dominant theme is the protection 
of consumers from overcharges.”); Elhauge, supra note 5, at 437 (“The legislative history 
. . . indicates that Congress wanted to protect consumer welfare.”); id. at 436 (“[A]ntitrust 
law clearly protects [consumer welfare rather than total welfare] when the two are in 
conflict.”). 
 20. See Gregory J. Werden, Monopsony and the Sherman Act:  Consumer Welfare in a 
New Light, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 707, 714 (2007) (“Congress intended to protect sellers 
victimized by trusts and other conduct within the scope of the Sherman Act’s prohibitions.”). 
 21. 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890). 
 22. Id. at 2457. 
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Representative Heard condemned the trusts for the same reason: 
We know that by such means the trusts which control the markets on 
sugar, nails, oils, lead, and almost every other article of use in the 
commerce of this country have advanced the cost of such articles to every 
consumer, and that without rendering the slightest equivalent therefor 
these illegal conspiracies against honest trade have stolen untold millions 
from the people.23 
Congressman Fithian endorsed the view of a constituent that the trusts were 
“impoverishing” the people through “robbery.”24  Senator George declared:  
“They aggregate to themselves great, enormous wealth by extortion which 
make [sic] the people poor.”25 
Likewise, Congress objected when the trusts used their power against 
upstream suppliers, depressing input prices below competitive levels and 
transferring wealth from powerless price takers to combinations of 
competitors.  Senator Sherman stated: 
They operate with a double-edged sword.  They increase beyond reason 
the cost of the necessaries of life and business, and they decrease the cost 
of the raw material, the farm products of the country.  They regulate 
prices at their will, depress the price of what they buy and increase the 
price of what they sell.26 
The beef trust was a repeated target of criticism.  Senator Allison noted that 
“there is a combination in the city of Chicago which not only keeps down 
the price of cattle upon the hoof, but also . . . make[s] the consumers of beef 
pay a high price for that article.”27  Representative Taylor asserted:  “The 
beef trust fixes arbitrarily the daily price of cattle. . . .  The farmers get from 
one-third to half of the former value of their cattle and yet beef is as costly 
as ever. . . .  This monster robs the farmer on the one hand and the 
consumer on the other.”28  The Senate appointed a special committee to 
investigate the beef trust and its report endorsed the Sherman Act.29 
In statements like these, members of Congress consistently condemned 
price fixing by the trusts, not because it distorted resource allocation or 
reduced total welfare but because it exploited consumers or small suppliers.  
Congress’s preference for consumers over economic efficiency was also 
apparent in the few instances in which senators or representatives focused 
 
 23. Id. at 4101. 
 24. Id. at 4103. 
 25. Id. at 1768. 
 26. Id. at 2461 (statement of Sen. George) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. Id. at 2470. 
 28. Id. at 4098. 
 29. See Werden, supra note 20, at 715–16; see also DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. 
ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL:  THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 321 
(2012) (“A key political force behind antitrust and the move to impose federal regulation of 
industry was . . . the farm vote. . . .  Indeed, nearly all the fifty-nine petitions that concerned 
trusts sent to Congress prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act came from farming states 
and emanated from organizations such as the Farmers’ Union, Farmers’ Alliance, Farmers’ 
Mutual Benefit Association, and Patrons of Animal Husbandry.”). 
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on behavior that might present tradeoffs between the two values.  The most 
important is the following statement by Senator Sherman:  “It is sometimes 
said of these combinations that they reduce prices to the consumer by better 
methods of production, but all experience shows that this saving of cost 
goes to the pockets of the producer.”30  This statement suggests that 
Sherman did not approve of horizontal combinations, even when they 
lowered production costs and raised total welfare, unless they passed on 
those savings to consumers.  As Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp note, 
Sherman “placed greater value on lower consumer prices than on economic 
efficiency generally.”31  Others in Congress resolved the tradeoff in the 
same way:  “The members of Congress who spoke on the question believed 
that combinations that lowered the costs of production but that also 
decreased output or increased prices should be condemned.”32 
Bork himself came to the same conclusion in his original analysis of the 
legislative history.  He stated that Congress’s opposition to combinations 
that created monopoly power “derived in large measure from a desire to 
protect consumers from monopoly extortion. . . .  Where producer and 
consumer welfare might come into conflict . . . Congress chose consumer 
welfare as decisive.”33  As a result, Bork declared:  “The touchstone of 
illegality is raising prices to consumers.  There were no exceptions.”34  In 
his subsequent book, The Antitrust Paradox, Bork redefined “consumer 
welfare” as “total welfare,” but the evidence he set forth showed that 
Congress had in fact adopted a true consumer welfare standard.35  Later, in 
discussing the proposed Clayton Act, Senator Thompson endorsed the same 
“touchstone” for evaluating conduct that Bork had discerned in the earlier 
legislative history.  Thompson stated:  “The chief purpose of antitrust 
legislation is for the protection of the public, to protect it from extortion 
practiced by the trust, but at the same time not to take away from it any 
advantages of cheapness or better service which honest, intelligent 
cooperation may bring.”36  The ultimate aim of the antitrust laws, in short, 
 
 30. 21 CONG. REC. 2460. 
 31. 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 103a. 
 32. Id. ¶ 101. 
 33. Bork, supra note 18, at 11. 
 34. Id. at 16. 
 35. See Elhauge, supra note 5, at 437–38 (“[W]hat [Bork] actually showed for the first 
109 pages of his famous book was that the antitrust laws embody a ‘consumer welfare’ 
standard, which on page 110 he converted into a total welfare standard with the logic that 
‘the monopoly and its owners . . . are also consumers,’ so that conduct that provides benefits 
to a monopolist that exceed the harm to traditional consumers is ‘merely a shift in income 
between two classes of consumers.’  Bork offered no evidence that Congress ever shared his 
rather specialized understanding of what a ‘consumer’ meant.” (quoting BORK, supra note 
18, at 110)); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
213, 250 (1985) (“Bork’s work has been called into question by subsequent scholarship 
showing that . . . Congress had no real concept of efficiency and was really concerned with 
protecting consumers from unfavorable wealth transfers.”); Orbach, supra note 3, at 136 
(“Bork was ‘confused’ when he used the term ‘consumer welfare.’”). 
 36. 51 CONG. REC. 14,223 (1914). 
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is to stop conduct that exploits consumers while allowing behavior that 
benefits them. 
Senator Hoar’s famous description of what constitutes monopolizing 
conduct is consistent with this test, though it does not explicitly endorse it. 
The key passage in the legislative history is this: 
MR. KENNA:  Suppose a citizen of Kentucky is dealing in shorthorn 
cattle and by virtue of his superior skill in that particular product it turns 
out that he is the only one in the Unites States to whom an order comes 
from Mexico for cattle of that stock for a considerable period, so that he is 
conceded to have a monopoly of that trade with Mexico; is it intended by 
the committee that the bill shall make that man a culprit? 
. . . . 
MR. HOAR:  [T]he word “monopoly” is a merely technical term which 
has a clear and legal signification, and it is this:  It is the sole engrossing 
to a man’s self by means which prevent other men from engaging in fair 
competition with him. . . . 
 I suppose, therefore, that the courts of the United States would say in 
the case put by the Senator from West Virginia that a man who merely by 
superior skill and intelligence, a breeder of horses or raiser of cattle, or 
manufacturer or artisan of any kind, got the whole business because 
nobody could do it as well as he could was not a monopolist, but that it 
involved something like the use of means which made it impossible for 
other persons to engage in fair competition, like the engrossing, the 
buying up of all other persons engaged in the same business.37 
For Senator Hoar, the standard for determining whether a businessman 
has obtained an illegal monopoly is whether he used “means which prevent 
other men from engaging in fair competition with him.”38  Hoar did not 
define “fair competition” and did not link it to either consumer welfare or 
total welfare, but the examples he gave of behavior that would and would 
not constitute monopolization suggest that he was more concerned about 
consumers than economic efficiency. 
According to Hoar, a businessman who prevailed in the marketplace 
“because nobody could do it as well as he could was not a monopolist.”39  
This safe harbor for superior performance serves consumer interests, for it 
encourages firms to gain market share by offering consumers the best 
possible products, prices, and service.  A firm that attains a monopoly by 
inventing a more appealing product plainly benefits its customers.  A firm 
that uses more efficient production methods or greater economies of scale 
to acquire a monopoly also benefits its customers because, in order to 
increase its market share, it passes on its cost advantages in the form of 
lower prices or higher quality.  To be sure, acquiring a monopoly through 
superior efficiency could harm consumers in the long run if the resulting 
 
 37. 21 CONG. REC. 3151–52 (1890). 
 38. Id. at 3152. 
 39. Id. 
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monopoly power imposed losses on them that outweighed the gains they 
realized when the firm was outcompeting its rivals.  But this would occur 
only if the monopoly was sufficiently large and long lasting.  If instead the 
supracompetitive pricing was limited in size and duration, consumers would 
be better off in the long run.  As explained below, a safe harbor for superior 
performance probably benefits consumers.40 
Hoar’s second example is not only consistent with a consumer protection 
goal, it suggests that consumer interests should trump economic efficiency.  
Hoar stated that “the buying up of all other persons engaged in the same 
business”41 would constitute monopolization.  Such conduct is very likely 
to harm consumers, at least for some time and to some degree.  But it could 
also increase total welfare if the combination of competitors lowered 
production costs significantly.42  Yet Hoar made no exception for such 
cases, suggesting that if he had been asked to resolve a conflict between 
consumers and economic efficiency, he would have chosen consumers.43 
In short, the predominant goal expressed in the legislative histories of the 
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act is the protection of consumers and small 
suppliers from anticompetitive conduct.  Congress recognized that 
combinations of competitors and single-firm exclusionary behavior could 
produce efficiency gains and, in sell-side cases, Congress wanted to 
encourage those gains to the extent they benefited consumers.  But to the 
extent conduct presented a tradeoff between consumer protection and 
efficiency, the congressmen who addressed the issue always resolved the 
tradeoff in favor of consumers.  While Congress may have felt considerable 
political pressure from small firms concerned about losing business to 
 
 40. The answer depends, narrowly, on the definition of superior performance and, more 
broadly, on whether there is an alternative legal standard that would better serve consumers.  
As Part II.B indicates, the most obvious alternative—a case-by-case determination of the 
long-term net impact of the defendant’s conduct on consumers—is almost certainly not 
preferable, since it would be more expensive to administer and is likely to result in 
overdeterrence of desirable conduct.  But Senator Hoar did not get into these details.  He 
articulated a broad safe harbor for superior performance, he framed it in terms of fairness, 
not welfare, and he illustrated it with examples that are more consistent with a consumer 
protection standard than a total welfare standard. Id. 
 41. 21 CONG. REC. 3152. 
 42. For the classic demonstration of this proposition, see generally Oliver E. 
Williamson, Economies As an Antitrust Defense:  The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. 
REV. 18 (1968). 
 43. For Senator Edmunds, the only other senator who responded to Senator Kenna, the 
sole issue was whether the conduct in question resulted in a monopoly.  It did not matter 
whether the conduct might have promoted efficiency.  Relying on a dictionary, Edmunds 
stated that “to monopolize” meant simply to “purchase or obtain possession of the whole of” 
or to “engross or obtain by any means the exclusive right of.” 21 CONG. REC. 3152.  In 
Kenna’s hypothetical, this test was not met, according to Edmunds, since the man who won 
the contract has “not got the possession of all the horned cattle in the United States.” Id.  But 
if he had, he would have violated section 2.  In Edmunds’s view, what matters is the result—
monopoly—not the means of obtaining it. 
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larger, more efficient rivals,44 the members who supported the Sherman Act 
almost never advocated it on these grounds.45  The public interest they 
identified was not the interest in protecting small business from 
competition, but the interest in protecting consumers and small suppliers 
from exploitation.  This same theme appears as the overarching objective of 
the other principal antitrust laws as well.46  In recent years, the case law has 
also largely adopted this perspective. 
B.  The Case Law 
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court gave considerable prominence to 
noneconomic values, particularly in its merger decisions, emphasizing that 
Congress wanted to preserve unconcentrated market structures even if 
consumers had to pay higher prices.47  By the late 1970s, however, the 
Court had embraced an economic approach to antitrust law, and several of 
its opinions described the purpose of antitrust or the nature of 
anticompetitive and procompetitive conduct in economic terms.48  Most 
notably, in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,49 the Court, citing Bork, announced 
that the legislative history suggests that the Sherman Act is a “consumer 
welfare prescription.”50  While the Court did not address whether it equated 
consumer welfare with total welfare, as Bork had, or whether it was using 
the term in its natural sense to refer to the welfare of consumers, its 
reference to Bork and its frequent resort to economic analysis led to a new 
 
 44. See 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 101 (“[T]he interest groups that 
communicated their concerns to Congress most effectively were small producers, whose 
injuries flowed mainly from the lower costs of larger, more efficient rivals.”). 
 45. See Lande, supra note 18, at 103 n.149 (“Only Representative Mason expressed an 
intent to protect small businesses at the expense of consumers.”). 
 46. See id. at 106–26, 130–42 (analyzing the legislative histories of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and the Celler-Kefauver Act, which amended the Clayton Act). 
 47. In the best-known example, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), 
the Court stated: 
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects.  But we cannot fail to 
recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of 
viable, small, locally owned businesses.  Congress appreciated that occasional 
higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries 
and markets.  It resolved these competing considerations in favor of 
decentralization. 
Id. at 344. 
 48. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the case that 
unmistakably signaled the change, the Court overruled its per se ban on nonprice vertical 
restraints and declared that per se rules must be based on “demonstrable economic effect.” 
Id. at 59.  Professor Muris called the opinion a “ringing endorsement of the economic 
approach to antitrust [law].” Timothy J. Muris, GTE Sylvania and the Empirical 
Foundations of Antitrust, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 900 (2001).  In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), the Court referred explicitly to 
economic efficiency, indicating that per se condemnation was inappropriate for conduct 
“designed to ‘increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, 
competitive.’” Id. at 20 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 
(1978)). 
 49. 442 U.S. 330 (1979). 
 50. Id. at 343 (citing BORK, supra note 18, at 66). 
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emphasis on economic efficiency, both in its own opinions and in lower 
court opinions, especially in the Seventh Circuit.51 
In 1982, Robert Lande published his analysis of the legislative histories 
of the principal antitrust laws, concluding that Congress’s overarching 
purpose was not promoting economic efficiency but “preventing ‘unfair’ 
transfers of wealth from consumers to firms with market power.”52  This 
article changed the terms of the debate.  The critical issue was no longer 
economic v. noneconomic values (efficiency v. populism) but which 
economic value should be dominant, consumer protection or economic 
efficiency.  Given the strength of Lande’s legislative history analysis, the 
appeal of consumer protection as a normative goal and the ease of 
administering a legal system with a single target in sell-side cases—
consumer impact—and a parallel target in buy-side cases, the case law has 
gradually but unmistakably embraced this goal.  While it is not the 
universal view, in the last two decades it has become the majority view. 
In 2008, Professor Lande and I documented this shift.  We surveyed 
judicial decisions issued in the prior fifteen years and concluded that when 
judges referred to the ultimate goal of antitrust or defined a key term like 
“anticompetitive,” they most often indicated that the fundamental objective 
is the protection of consumers in sell-side cases and the protection of small 
suppliers in buy-side cases.53  Two Supreme Court cases were particularly 
revealing.  In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,54 the 
Court indicated that the purpose of the rule of reason is to determine the 
effect of a practice on consumers.  Indeed, the Court expressly equated 
anticompetitive effect with harm to consumers and procompetitive effect 
with benefit to consumers.55  In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp.,56 the Court identified the “traditional concern” of the 
antitrust laws as “consumer welfare and price competition”57 and made 
clear that consumer welfare referred to the welfare of consumers in the 
relevant market, not economic efficiency.  In explaining why unsuccessful 
 
 51. See Ginsburg, supra note 10 (discussing Supreme Court cases from the late 1970s to 
the mid-1980s); see also Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1437 (7th Cir. 
1986) (“The purpose of antitrust law, at least as articulated in the modern cases, is to protect 
the competitive process as a means of promoting economic efficiency.”); Olympia Equip. 
Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he emphasis of 
antitrust policy shifted from the protection of competition as a process of rivalry to the 
protection of competition as a means of promoting economic efficiency . . . .”). 
 52. Lande, supra note 18, at 68; see also id. at 68–69 (“Congress intended to subordinate 
all other concerns to the basic purpose of preventing firms with market power from directly 
harming consumers.”). 
 53. See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust:  
Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 211–36 
(2008) (collecting and analyzing recent cases). 
 54. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 55. Id. at 894–95.  The rule of reason “distinguishes between restraints with 
anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating 
competition that are in the consumer’s best interest.” Id. at 886. 
 56. 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
 57. Id. at 221. 
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predation should not be condemned, even though it may cause allocative 
inefficiency, the Court pointed out that it “produces lower aggregate prices 
in the market, and consumer welfare is enhanced.”58  Thus, in Brooke 
Group, the Court measured consumer welfare by the level of prices in the 
market, not allocative efficiency.59 
Many circuit court cases also indicated that the paramount goal of 
antitrust is the protection of consumers, not the welfare of society.  For 
example, the Sixth Circuit quoted a trial court’s statement that the “the very 
purpose of antitrust law is to ensure that the benefits of competition flow to 
purchasers of goods affected by the violation.”60  Similarly, the Seventh 
Circuit declared:  “The principal purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent 
overcharges to consumers.”61  In United States v. Microsoft Corp.,62 the 
D.C. Circuit, like the Supreme Court in Leegin, equated anticompetitive 
effect with consumer harm:  “[T]o be condemned as exclusionary, a 
monopolist’s act must have an ‘anticompetitive effect.’  That is, it must 
harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers.”63  Likewise, 
the Tenth Circuit asserted:  “To be judged anticompetitive, the [conduct] 
must actually or potentially harm consumers.”64 
More important, whenever the cases confronted a conflict between 
protecting consumers and promoting efficiency, they always chose 
consumers.  Looking at merger cases, where the potential conflict between 
consumer welfare and total welfare is most often noted, Professor Lande 
and I concluded: 
No court in the United States . . . has ever allowed a merger that was 
likely to increase prices in the relevant market (or otherwise deprive 
consumers of the choices a competitive market would provide) on the 
ground that it was likely to enhance economic efficiency.  To the 
contrary, the courts have uniformly insisted that merging parties cannot 
 
 58. Id. at 224.  Similarly, the Court described “unsuccessful predation” as a “boon to 
consumers.” Id. 
 59. The Court also stated that the legal standards it established were applicable in 
section 2 cases, id. at 222, suggesting that the Court saw the ultimate purpose of section 2 as 
consumer protection, not total welfare. 
 60. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re 
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 651 (E.D. Mich. 2000)). 
 61. Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health Servs., Inc., 463 F.3d 710, 715 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 814 F.2d 358, 368 (7th 
Cir. 1987)), cert denied, 549 U.S. 1209 (2007). 
 62. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 63. Id. at 58.  Both the Eleventh Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have quoted this 
statement. See Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 376 F.3d 
1065, 1071–72 (11th Cir. 2004); Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 
1294 (11th Cir. 2004); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 206 (4th Cir. 2002).  To 
be sure, earlier in its opinion, the D.C. Circuit had linked competitive impact to “social 
welfare.” See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58 (“The challenge for an antitrust court lies in 
stating a general rule for distinguishing between exclusionary acts, which reduce social 
welfare, and competitive acts, which increase it.”).  The statement quoted above deserves 
more weight, however, because, unlike the earlier remark, it is part of the court’s formulation 
of the legal standard to be applied in section 2 cases. See id. at 58–59. 
 64. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 965 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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establish an efficiencies defense unless they show both that the merger 
would generate significant cost savings and that enough of those savings 
would be passed on to consumers that consumers would benefit from (or 
at least not be hurt by) the merger.65 
Professor Hovenkamp recently asserted that courts have resolved conflicts 
between consumer welfare and total welfare in the same way in all areas of 
antitrust law: 
[I]f the evidence in a particular case indicates that a challenged practice 
facilitates the exercise of market power, resulting in output that is actually 
lower and prices that are actually higher, then tribunals uniformly 
condemn the restraint without regard to offsetting efficiencies.  Indeed, 
one is hard pressed to find a single appellate decision that made a fact 
finding that a challenged practice resulted in lower market wide output 
and higher prices, but that also went on to approve the restraint because 
proven efficiencies exceeded consumer losses.  In sum, courts almost 
invariably apply a consumer welfare test.66 
Since our 2008 article, just a few appellate courts have commented on the 
goals of antitrust law.  In the most important case, California v. Safeway, 
Inc.,67 the Ninth Circuit explained that there are actually two, parallel 
goals—protecting consumers in sell-side cases and competitive suppliers in 
buy-side cases—as this Article suggests.  The court then identified the 
ultimate touchstone as “consumer good”: 
 Congress sought to ensure that competitors not cut deals aimed at 
stifling competition and at permitting higher prices to be charged to 
consumers than would be expected in a competitive environment, or 
permitting lower prices to be paid to those from whom competitors 
bought materials than a fair market rate.  The touchstone is consumer 
good.68 
 
 65. Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 53, at 225.  The federal government’s merger 
guidelines take the same position, recognizing efficiencies only to the extent that they 
prevent harm to consumers in the relevant market. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2010/08/100819hmg.pdf (“[T]he Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely 
would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant 
market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.”); Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 
2476–77 (stating that, under the 2010 Guidelines, “if the merger is likely to result in a 
market-wide output reduction and price increase. . . .  then the proponents of the merger will 
have an opportunity to show compensating efficiencies.  But the magnitude of the 
efficiencies must be sufficiently large to offset any predicted price increase.  In sum, the 
merger will be permitted only where there is no consumer harm, regardless of the size of the 
efficiencies.”). 
 66. Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 2477 (concluding that “antitrust policy in the United 
States follows a consumer welfare approach in that it condemns restraints that actually result 
in monopoly output reductions, whether or not there are offsetting efficiencies and regardless 
of their size.”). 
 67. 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 68. Id. at 1132. 
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Similarly, the Second Circuit, in the course of analyzing a preemption 
issue, equated competitive effect with the impact on consumers.69  
Likewise, the Third Circuit refused to apply the “scope of the patent test” to 
a reverse payment settlement because, “while such a rule might be good 
policy from the perspective of name brand and generic pharmaceutical 
producers, it is bad policy from the perspective of the consumer, precisely 
the constituency Congress was seeking to protect.”70  The Eleventh Circuit 
described the “animating concern” of the Sherman Act as “consumer 
welfare,” but said that it should be “understood in the sense of allocative 
efficiency.”71  The court relied on Brooke Group for this proposition 
without appreciating that the Supreme Court had equated consumer welfare 
with the benefits received by consumers in the relevant market, not with 
allocative efficiency.72  While two other circuit court decisions described 
the fundamental objective as economic efficiency, both relied on precedent 
from the 1970s and 1980s without recognizing either conflicting precedent 
during that era or the substantial movement since then.73 
In the last two decades, in short, a majority of decisions, at all levels of 
the federal courts, have described the overarching goal of the antitrust laws 
as the protection of consumers rather than the maximization of social 
welfare.  Most decisions, of course, did not address the issue, but those that 
did typically characterized the ultimate purpose as protecting consumers, 
not enhancing efficiency.  In buy-side cases, the courts likewise placed the 
emphasis on protecting small suppliers from exploitation, not promoting 
total welfare.74  No court has allowed a practice or transaction that was 
 
 69. See Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Cuomo, 624 F.3d 38, 50 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 70. In re K-DUR Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 217 (3d Cir. 2012).  Although the court 
was referring to Congress’s purpose in passing the Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (1984), the court’s characterization of the goal of antitrust law was identical.  It 
quoted Judge Pooler’s statement that the scope of the patent test “is insufficiently protective 
of the consumer interests safeguarded by the Hatch-Waxman Act and the antitrust laws.” In 
re K-DUR Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 213 (quoting In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 
466 F.3d 187, 224 (2d Cir. 2006) (Pooler, J., dissenting)). 
 71. Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 72. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 73. In Fayus Enters. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 602 F.3d 444, 453–54 (D.C. Cir. 2010), Judge 
Williams wrote:  “There has been a tension—and in federal antitrust law a radical change 
over time—between the goal of increasing consumer welfare in the economic efficiency 
sense and contrasting goals such as protecting small competitors or preventing the 
concentration of economic or political power without regard to economic efficiency.”  Judge 
Williams is correct that antitrust law has almost completely abandoned populist goals like 
the protection of small business and the deconcentration of social and political power.  That 
change, however, occurred in the 1970s and 1980s.  Since then, the courts’ emphasis on 
efficiency has largely been replaced by a focus on consumer and small supplier protection, 
as this Article indicates. In Valuepest.com of Charlotte, Inc. v. Bayer Corp., 561 F.3d 282 
(4th Cir. 2009), the court stated that the “purpose of antitrust law, at least as articulated in the 
modern cases, is to protect the competitive process as a means of promoting economic 
efficiency.” Id. at 290–91 (quoting Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1437 
(7th Cir. 1986)).  Instead of citing a recent case, however, the court relied on a twenty-seven-
year-old Seventh Circuit decision. 
 74. See California v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011); West Penn 
Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 105 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that 
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shown likely to harm consumers or small suppliers on the ground that it 
would improve economic efficiency. 
At the same time, the courts have continued to allow firms to grow 
through superior performance, outcompeting their rivals by offering lower 
prices, better service, or higher quality products, even when the result is a 
monopoly.  As Part II.B explains in more detail, however, this safe harbor 
for superior performance—for “competition on the merits”—is consistent 
with an overriding concern for the welfare of consumers rather than total 
welfare.  Indeed, Judge Posner himself described the contours of section 2 
liability in terms of consumer protection:  “Most businessmen . . . want to 
make as much money as possible and getting a monopoly is one way of 
making a lot of money.  That is fine, however, so long as they do not use 
methods calculated to make consumers worse off in the long run.”75 
This same consumer orientation underlies the popular support for 
antitrust laws. 
C.  Popular Support 
Fortune found that even after the government had sued Microsoft, many 
people still thought highly of the firm and its products.76  Nevertheless, “a 
very large majority—fully 80 percent—also believed that the Justice 
department ought to enforce antitrust laws.”77  When asked, “How 
important is the enforcement of antitrust laws?,” 80 percent responded that 
it was “important.”78  Fortune did not ask why so many Americans 
supported antitrust enforcement, but it is likely that they favored antitrust 
not because they saw it as a way of increasing the efficiency of the 
economy, but because they viewed it as a way of protecting themselves and 
other consumers from exploitation at the hands of firms that have 
improperly acquired market power. 
Numerous commentators have explained popular and political support 
for the antitrust laws in this way.  Professors Havighurst and Richman 
declared:  “[T]he antitrust laws enjoy general political support principally 
because the consuming public resents the idea of illegitimate monopolists 
enriching themselves at their expense.”79  The American Antitrust Institute 
stated that “antitrust cannot sustain political support over the long haul 
 
“paying [the plaintiff] artificially depressed reimbursement rates was an anticompetitive 
aspect of the alleged conspiracy”); Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 53, at 233–36. 
 75. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 
1986).  Posner also asserted that section 2 encourages hard competition by monopolists in 
order to promote economic efficiency. See id. at 375.  But his willingness to explain section 
2 as a consumer protection measure suggests that one can account for the safe harbor without 
assuming a total welfare goal. 
 76. See Rick Tetzeli & David Kirkpatrick, America Loves Microsoft, FORTUNE, Feb. 2, 
1998, at 80. 
 77. Id. at 82. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in 
Health Care, 89 OR. L. REV. 847, 860 (2011). 
 2013] THE ESSENCE OF ANTITRUST 2445 
unless it is employed and publicly recognized fundamentally as a consumer 
protection policy.”80  Nelson and White noted:  “The social loss from the 
monopoly is the deadweight loss triangle, although the transfer of 
consumers’ surplus from buyers to the monopolist clearly weighs 
importantly in the political support for antitrust policy.”81  Professor Orbach 
observed that “consumer welfare” is a “phrase of great rhetorical power”82 
and that “[e]very novice politician knows that he can gain some political 
capital by arguing that his agenda also promotes consumer interests.”83  
Professor Kaplow, who believes that antitrust should pursue total welfare, 
nevertheless acknowledged that, “for external audiences, the term consumer 
welfare seems both more comprehensible and more appealing than total 
welfare.”84  The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise commented:  “Every member 
of society is a consumer, while not everyone is an entrepreneur, so the most 
‘populist’ goal of all may be the one that promotes consumer welfare.”85  
Thus, “any interest group approach to antitrust is best off to recognize 
‘consumers’ as its protected class.”86  In explaining why competition is 
desirable, even among government entities, Professor Mankiw emphasized 
its benefits for consumers.87 
The largest group of antitrust lawyers in the country, the Antitrust 
Section of the American Bar Association, proclaims on its logo that its 
mission is “Promoting Competition” and “Protecting Consumers.”88  The 
section does not refer to efficiency or social welfare.  Neither does the 
 
 80. AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA:  THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST 
INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH PRESIDENT 9 (Albert 
A. Foer ed., 2008). 
 81. Philip B. Nelson & Lawrence J. White, Market Definition and the Identification of 
Market Power in Monopolization Cases:  A Critique and a Proposal 6 (NYU, Working 
Paper No. EC-03-26, 2003), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1292646. 
 82. Orbach, supra note 3, at 135. 
 83. Id. at 145. 
 84. Louis Kaplow, On the Choice of Welfare Standards in Competition Law 1 n.2 
(Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 693, 2011), available at http://www.ssrn.com/
abstract=1873432. 
 85. 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 100b. 
 86. Id. ¶ 111c. 
 87. Mankiw, an economist, did not mention economic efficiency: 
  Most everyone agrees that competition is vital to a well-functioning market 
economy.  Since the days of Adam Smith, economists have understood that the 
invisible hand of the marketplace works only if producers of goods and services 
vie with one another.  Competition keeps prices low and provides an incentive to 
improve and innovate. 
  Granted, competition is not always good for producers.  I produce economics 
textbooks.  I curse the fact that my competitors are constantly putting out new, 
improved editions that threaten my market share.  But knowing that I have to keep 
up with the Paul Krugmans and the Glenn Hubbards of the world keeps me on my 
toes.  It makes me work hard, benefiting the customers—in this case, students. 
N. Gregory Mankiw, Competition Is Healthy for Governments, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 
2012, at 5 (Sunday Business). 
 88. The Section’s logo also appears, among other places, on the front cover of its 
signature publication, the Antitrust Law Journal. See, e.g., 78 ANTITRUST L.J. no. 2, cover 
pg. (2012). 
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Federal Trade Commission, whose website prominently features a single 
objective:  “Protecting America’s Consumers.”89 
In a recent address to the Antitrust Section, Senator Al Franken 
repeatedly characterized antitrust as a consumer protection measure.  He 
noted, first of all, that “John Sherman himself said that the purpose of his 
landmark antitrust legislation was to protect consumers by preventing 
arrangements designed to increase the price they paid for goods.”90  He then 
explained, in many different ways, how antitrust enforcement affects 
consumers.  For example, when the nation fails to enforce antitrust laws 
effectively, it poses “dangers . . . to consumers.”91  When AT&T held a 
monopoly, “consumers paid the price—exorbitant rates for long-distance 
service.”92 
What we didn’t need to question was what [the proposed merger of 
AT&T and T-Mobile] would mean for consumers. . . .  [A]n independent 
analysis of the merger estimated that it would raise wireless prices by 12 
to 25 percent for T-Mobile customers and 5 to 11 percent for AT&T 
customers. . . .  The bottom line for consumers would have been worse 
service for more money.93 
He also declared that “[w]hen a company is able to establish a dominant 
market position, consumers lose meaningful choices.”94  In short, 
throughout his speech Senator Franken measured antitrust enforcement 
against a single metric:  whether consumers are better or worse off. 
Franken’s stance reflects an obvious fact:  none of his constituents wants 
to pay artificially high prices for the products they buy.  But popular 
support for antitrust law also has a deeper, normative basis.  A pioneering 
study by Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler showed that 
many consumers regard monopolistic exploitation as unfair, whether or not 
they are the victims.95  As Kahneman later summarized the key result, a 
“basic rule of fairness, we found, is that the exploitation of market power to 
impose losses on others is unacceptable.”96  For those who hold this belief, 
antitrust enforcement has moral value.  Whether or not they have to pay 
higher prices, they regard their society as less fair if it allows firms to take 
advantage of unearned market power to extract wealth from their 
 
 89. See FTC, http://www.ftc.gov (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 90. Al Franken, U.S. Senator, Minn., How Privacy Has Become an Antitrust Issue, 
Address to the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association 4 (Mar. 30, 2012), 
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/al-franken/how-privacy-has-become-an_b_1392
580.html. 
 91. Id. at 3. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 4. 
 94. Id. at 6. 
 95. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness As a Constraint 
on Profit Seeking:  Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1986). 
 96. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 306 (2011). 
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customers.  In short, for people with this belief, antitrust is a component of 
a just society.97 
Kahneman and his colleagues used telephone surveys to determine 
whether people would regard particular price increases as unfair.  In one 
hypothetical, a hardware store had been charging $15 for snow shovels but 
raised the price to $20 after a blizzard.  A very large majority of 
respondents (82 percent) considered this price increase unfair,98 probably 
because the store had done nothing to deserve the increase, such as bring in 
additional shovels, at extra cost, in order to meet the post-storm demand.  In 
other cases where a firm charged higher prices, not because its costs had 
increased but because it possessed market power, most people also 
characterized the high prices as unfair.  For instance, respondents were 
“nearly unanimous in condemning a store that raises prices when its sole 
competitor in a community is temporarily forced to close.”99  More than 
three quarters of respondents thought it was unfair for a chain to charge 
higher prices in a community where it faced no competition, even though its 
costs were no higher in that locale.100  And 91 percent disapproved of a 
landlord who raised the rent for one of his tenants beyond what he charged 
others because he learned that this tenant was unlikely to move.101  In each 
of these cases, large majorities of those surveyed felt that it was unfair to 
force consumers to pay higher prices simply because the seller had the 
power to do so. 
 
 97. This belief may also have economic significance.  To the extent that people have a 
“taste for fairness” (that is, their utility increases when they perceive that their society has 
become more fair), greater fairness leads to greater total welfare, everything else equal.  As 
Part II.A notes, this link between antitrust and total welfare is independent of the calculation 
of producer surplus and consumer surplus in a particular market.  It represents an additional 
contribution to total welfare, the size of which depends on the economic value it has for 
people with this preference (that is, their willingness to pay for it). 
 98. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 95, at 729. 
 99. Id. at 735. 
 100. Id.  Other studies have found similar results. See Lan Xia, Kent B. Monroe & 
Jennifer L. Cox, The Price Is Unfair! A Conceptual Framework of Price Fairness 
Perceptions, 68 J. MARKETING 1, 4 (2004) (citing Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler and two 
other studies for the proposition that when “buyers believe that sellers have increased prices 
to take advantage of an increase in demand or a scarcity of supply, without a corresponding 
increase in costs, they will perceive the new higher prices as unfair”). 
 101. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 95, at 735.  People tend to regard price 
discrimination as unfair, even when they receive the lower price, unless there is a clear, 
acceptable basis for the differential. See Lan Xia, Kent B. Monroe & Jennifer L. Cox, Is a 
Good Deal Always Fair?  Examining the Concepts of Transaction Value and Price Fairness, 
31 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 884, 892 (2010) (describing research finding that “paying a price that 
is less than the reference price may be perceived to be less fair when the reference price is a 
higher price paid by another customer for a similar transaction”); id. at 893 (suggesting “it 
may help [to reduce the perceived unfairness] to provide customers with a good rationale for 
the preferential treatment, such as stating that only loyal customers or customers with special 
status (e.g., senior citizens) have the opportunity to receive a lower price”); see also Ellen 
Garbarino & Sarah Maxwell, Consumer Response to Norm-Breaking Pricing Events in E-
commerce, 63 J. BUS. RES. 1066, 1069 (2010) (finding a “broad-based and strong belief in 
the norm that all customers of the same retailer should be charged the same price”). 
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Kahneman and his coauthors did not explore whether popular attitudes 
would have been different if the market power had been earned through 
superior performance.  Presumably they would have been.  After all, the 
overarching rule that the authors derive from their survey results would not 
condemn market power based on superior performance.  According to the 
authors, the “cardinal rule of fair behavior is surely that one person should 
not achieve a gain by simply imposing an equivalent loss on another.”102  
When a firm gains market power through procompetitive behavior, it does 
not simply impose a loss on its customers.  Instead, its desirable behavior 
makes them better off.  In addition, the ability to acquire market power 
through such behavior gives the firm an incentive to engage in it.  For both 
reasons, market power earned through superior performance would not 
violate Kahneman’s cardinal rule.  His results are consistent, therefore, with 
the view that the American people generally disapprove of the exercise of 
market power where the power was attained through anticompetitive rather 
than procompetitive behavior.103 
There appears to be no evidence that most people support the antitrust 
laws because they tend to raise the total wealth or total welfare of the 
country.  Rather, people approve of antitrust enforcement because it 
protects them and other citizens from exploitation by firms that have 
acquired—but not earned—market power.  People object to such 
exploitation because, like robbery or extortion, it is an unwarranted transfer 
of wealth, harming its victims (consumers or small suppliers) without 
providing offsetting benefits.  When market power provides offsetting 
benefits—when it was created by a superior product, for example, or cost 
reductions that were passed on—the American people do not appear to 
regard it as unfair.  The test for whether a benefit is offsetting, however, is 
whether it outweighs the harm to consumers or small suppliers from market 
power, not whether it enhances economic efficiency. 
This normative framework appears to be acceptable to the business 
community as well.  Business leaders do not, to my knowledge, argue that 
the antitrust laws ought to be interpreted in ways that elevate total welfare 
over consumer or small supplier protection, enabling businesses to raise 
prices to consumers or depress prices to small suppliers, so long as their 
conduct enhances economic efficiency.  Rather, members of the business 
 
 102. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 95, at 729. 
 103. While Kahneman and his colleagues did not study attitudes toward monopsonistic 
exploitation of small suppliers, it is highly likely that the public would also regard such 
exploitation as unfair.  As Professor Stucke points out, many consumers object when 
companies outsource production to foreign factories that pay low wages, require long hours, 
and provide poor working conditions, even when those terms are set in a competitive market 
and benefit consumers. See Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror, 62 
EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 43), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2094553 (“Although consumers can economically benefit from the exploitation of sellers, 
they nonetheless object to such exploitation. We see this with Nike, Apple, and the growth of 
Fair Trade products.”).  If consumers object when firms pay competitive prices to small 
suppliers, they would object even more when firms with monopsony power force vulnerable 
suppliers to accept prices below the competitive level. 
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community seem comfortable with an antitrust enforcement regime focused 
on consumer and small supplier protection.  In large part, that is because the 
antitrust laws, as currently interpreted, give businesses considerable 
flexibility to pursue profits and growth.  As this Article has emphasized, the 
antitrust laws permit a firm to dominate the marketplace through superior 
performance, a doctrine that generally benefits both the successful firm and 
the customers that it serves.104  In addition, over the last thirty years, the 
courts have substantially loosened restrictions on business behavior, making 
it easier for firms to gain market share through procompetitive conduct.105  
If these changes were undone, business opposition to the content and goals 
of antitrust would undoubtedly arise but, at present, there is no widespread 
objection to a standard that aligns antitrust law with one of the most 
frequently articulated strategic objectives of business—serving customers. 
This orientation also makes the antitrust laws easier to administer.  When 
antitrust has a single target in sell-side cases and a comparable objective in 
buy-side cases, it is easier to explain the law to judges and juries and easier 
to resolve disputes. 
D.  Ease of Administration 
A consumer protection standard supplies a simple and straightforward 
test for evaluating the competitive significance of conduct:  does it make 
consumers better or worse off?  In many cases, the inquiry under such a 
standard is elementary:  would the conduct cause prices to go up or down?  
In contrast, a total welfare standard requires a broader inquiry.  In cases in 
which the challenged conduct would impose losses on consumers, the 
ultimate issue under a consumer protection standard has already been 
resolved:  consumers would be hurt.  Under a total welfare standard, 
however, the losses to consumers must be compared to any gains that the 
producers would realize, since a reduction in consumer surplus could be 
offset by an increase in producer surplus.  A total welfare standard, as its 
name implies, is broader than a consumer protection standard and entails 
additional analysis. 
This difference does not matter in cases subject to a bright line rule.  In 
such cases, courts and enforcement agencies can apply the rule without 
determining the actual or probable effects of the challenged practice.  The 
administrability of such a rule depends on how clear it is, not on the 
substantive goals or objectives it is designed to achieve.  Thus, if the rule is 
bright enough, it can be intended to further multiple objectives, 
noneconomic as well as economic, without creating administrative 
 
 104. For further elaboration, see infra Part II.B.1. 
 105. See Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics:  Perspectives on the Goals and 
Future of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2185 (2013) (listing the principal changes in 
antitrust rules since the mid-1970s and stating that “in general, the rules were modified for a 
good reason:  they chilled cost reductions and other efficiency-enhancing conduct”). 
 2450 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
difficulties.106  But where effects must be assessed, a consumer protection 
standard would be easier to implement. 
To be sure, under either a consumer or small supplier protection standard, 
it is necessary to identify the consumers or suppliers to be protected.  In a 
sell-side case, for example, should antitrust law focus on the immediate 
purchasers, the consumers in the relevant market, or the end users, the 
ultimate consumers?  As Lande and I have recommended, the pertinent 
consumers should be the consumers in the relevant market.107  This makes 
administration easier, for otherwise it would be necessary to trace the 
effects of a practice down to final consumers, an inquiry that can be quite 
difficult.108  Moreover, direct purchasers frequently pass on at least part of a 
price rise to end users, making impact on direct purchasers a reasonable 
proxy for impact on ultimate consumers.  For the same reasons, in a buy-
side case, the pertinent suppliers should ordinarily be the direct suppliers.109 
Identifying the relevant consumers significantly enhances the 
administrability of a consumer protection standard, but it does not eliminate 
every issue.  The challenged conduct may have different effects on different 
customers, its short-run impact may differ from its long-term impact, and its 
consequences for the price of the relevant product may diverge from its 
effects on quality or variety.  All of these issues must be addressed, since 
the fundamental question under a consumer protection standard is the effect 
of the behavior on the long-term well-being of consumers in the relevant 
market.  In principle, of course, if sufficient information is available, an 
aggregate long-term impact may be determined but, in practice, the effort 
 
 106. See, e.g., Stucke, supra note 5 (advocating the development of bright-line rules that 
would further multiple objectives, not just consumer welfare or total welfare).  In the 
absence of a bright-line rule, however, a legal standard that required courts to assess the 
effects of conduct on multiple objectives is likely to be onerous to administer.  It would 
require judges or juries to measure the actual or probable impact of the practice on each of 
the objectives and then weigh those effects against each other, a task that would be 
challenging, time consuming, and sometimes arbitrary. 
 107. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 53, at 203 (“[A]ny direct purchaser should be 
deemed a ‘consumer’ for antitrust purposes, regardless of what he or she decided to do with 
the good or service purchased.”). 
 108. Id. (explaining that if immediate purchasers are not the focus, “every price rise 
caused by a monopoly, cartel, etc. would have to be examined to determine whether it had 
been absorbed by intermediaries or whether, and to what degree, it had been passed on to 
[ultimate] consumers”); see also Werden, supra note 20, at 730 (“If end-user welfare were 
made the touchstone, it would become necessary to trace the incidence of effects all the way 
down the distribution chain.  This necessarily would impose an additional burden on 
plaintiffs and the courts; moreover, in some cases, no end-user harm flows from conduct 
normally considered anticompetitive.”). 
 109. Thus, where buyers exercise monopsony power against competitive suppliers, it 
would not be necessary to trace the effects further upstream.  Where the direct suppliers have 
significant market power, however, and buyers exercise countervailing power rather than 
monopsony power against them, it may be necessary to look further upstream, since in such 
cases it is sometimes possible for the effects of countervailing power to be “passed back” to 
competitive suppliers further upstream. See Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Power and the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines:  Minor Progress on an Important Issue, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
775, 807–08 (2012); Kirkwood, supra note 11, at 1554–56. In such cases, it would be 
appropriate to focus on the more remote suppliers. 
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may be difficult and subjective.  The same kinds of problems, however, 
must be faced under a total welfare standard, which must also determine the 
probable impact of the challenged conduct on consumers.  In short, a total 
welfare standard is no easier to administer than a consumer protection 
standard and, in any case where gains to producers must be offset against 
losses to consumers, a total welfare standard is more burdensome. 
In addition, the analysis under a total welfare standard is more 
complicated than the analysis under a consumer protection standard.  Under 
a consumer protection standard, the easiest way to show consumer harm is 
to establish that the challenged conduct would cause prices in the relevant 
market to go up, unaccompanied by any increase in quality or service.  As a 
result, consumers would pay more for the relevant product and a portion of 
their wealth would be transferred to the producers.  Under a total welfare 
standard, however, this transfer of wealth is ignored, since the other 
protected group under the standard—producers—receives the transferred 
wealth.  What counts under a total welfare standard is the allocative 
inefficiency caused by the overcharge, the lost sales or deadweight loss 
produced by the price increase, and it may be more difficult to estimate that 
magnitude than to determine whether or not prices will rise.110 
The analysis of productive efficiency is also more complex under a total 
welfare standard.  Under both standards, it is necessary to evaluate whether 
the challenged practice would generate efficiencies of sufficient magnitude 
and appropriate type to cause prices to fall or consumers to benefit in other 
ways.  If consumers would benefit, the practice would be procompetitive 
under either standard.  If the practice would harm consumers, however, it 
would be condemned, without more, under a consumer protection standard.  
But under a total welfare standard, a court or agency would still have to 
determine whether its beneficial effect on productive efficiency would 
outweigh its adverse effect on allocative efficiency.111  And that step would 
 
 110. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 2478 (deadweight loss “results from unmade sales 
and inefficient substitutions and is much more difficult to assess than simple overcharges”).  
The administrative advantage of a consumer protection standard is greatest when prices have 
already gone up.  Then, under a consumer protection standard, the only question is whether 
there was an innocent explanation for the increase, such as higher costs or a spurt in demand.  
Under a total welfare standard, however, it would be necessary not only to rule out innocent 
explanations but also to calculate the impact of the price increase on allocative efficiency, 
which would require measuring the elasticity of demand.  In contrast, the standards may 
differ little, if at all, in their administrability when the question is whether the challenged 
conduct is likely to result in a significant price increase (say 5–10 percent).  Under either 
standard, answering that question would require estimating the elasticity of demand. 
 111. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of 
Antitrust:  An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 489 (2012) (recognizing the 
need for “reliable estimates” of both “the prospective cost savings and the prospective 
allocative inefficiency” in order to apply a total welfare standard, and noting that this is “a 
particularly daunting requirement” in the case of a proposed merger because “both estimates 
are needed before the merger is actually approved”); see also Alan A. Fisher, Frederick 
Johnson & Robert H. Lande, Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 777, 
809–13 (1989); Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger 
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require looking at all aspects of productive efficiency, not just those that 
would affect prices in the relevant market.  In particular, savings in fixed 
costs that would not normally be considered in assessing the impact of a 
merger on prices (because they would not affect the total quantity produced 
by the merging parties) would have to be considered in measuring producer 
surplus (because they would contribute to the parties’ profits from the 
transaction).112 
In sum, where effects on competition must be assessed, it is likely to be 
less complicated and less costly to perform that assessment where the 
ultimate goal is the protection of consumers and small suppliers rather than 
total welfare.113  Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that no U.S. 
court has ever attempted a full total welfare calculation.114 
II.  OBJECTIONS 
As the prior part demonstrated, the goal of protecting consumers and 
small suppliers from anticompetitive conduct is deeply rooted in the 
legislative history, widely endorsed in the case law, broadly supported by 
the American people, and relatively easy to administer.  To depart from that 
goal—to allow firms that have gained market power without earning it to 
exploit consumers or small suppliers in the relevant market—requires a 
powerful counterargument.  Two principal counterarguments have been 
 
Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1624–77 (1983) (detailing the difficulties involved in 
assessing a merger’s impact on economic efficiency). 
 112. See Baker, supra note 105, at 2178 n.13 (observing that “courts are less likely to 
make mistakes” in evaluating merger efficiencies “when applying a consumer welfare 
standard than an aggregate surplus standard, as the consumer surplus criterion avoids the 
need to analyze fixed cost savings”). 
 113. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 2496 (“When one considers both efficiency and 
administrability, consumer welfare emerges as the most practical goal of antitrust 
enforcement.  In cases where consumer effects are more-or-less uniform, the consumer 
welfare principle usually requires smaller amounts of information to implement and avoids 
the costs and numerous errors associated with any kind of balancing of welfare gains and 
losses to different groups.”); id. at 2478 (“If true quantification of deadweight consumer 
losses and producer gains were required, antitrust would be way outside of its 
competence.”). 
  “When no firm conclusions can be drawn about consumer impact,” Hovenkamp 
would consider producer gains:  “For example, if a tying arrangement produces significant 
producer gains but impacts different consumers differently and net harm or benefit is 
impossible to determine, then the law should be reluctant to intervene.” Id. at 2496.  This 
makes sense because producer gains from increased efficiency free up resources for use in 
other markets, raising output and lowering prices in those markets, benefiting the consumers 
in those markets. See infra note 115.  Thus, when it is impossible to tell whether conduct 
would reduce the overall welfare of consumers in the relevant market, but it is clear that the 
conduct would enhance productive efficiency, a court should allow the conduct, since it 
would enhance the well-being of consumers in other markets (and raise total welfare). 
 114. Only one foreign court has made such a calculation.  The Canadian Competition 
Tribunal allowed the merger of Superior Propane and ICG Propane, even though it would 
harm consumers, because the Tribunal calculated that it would produce a substantial increase 
in total welfare, a decision that was affirmed on appeal. See Comm’r of Competition v. 
Superior Propane, Inc., [2003] 3 F.C. 529 (Can.).  For a summary of the Tribunal’s analysis, 
see Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 53, at 227–28 n.171. 
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advanced.  Both maintain that the ultimate objective of antitrust should be 
total welfare, at least in certain cases, and that the interests of consumers or 
small suppliers in the relevant market should be trumped by aggregate 
welfare where the two conflict.  The first argument is that total welfare is a 
superior goal from a normative perspective because it is more 
comprehensive.  The second is that total welfare is the goal of section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, because Congress and the courts have made clear that a 
firm does not violate section 2 if it gains monopoly power through superior 
efficiency.  In the following sections, I address each argument.  I also 
address a more limited attack on the consumer protection standard:  the 
argument that antitrust enforcement would actually harm consumers if it 
brought down the prices of dangerous goods like cigarettes or status goods 
like fancy watches. 
A.  The Normative Attraction of Total Welfare 
Compared to consumer or small supplier protection, total welfare is a 
more inclusive goal.  In a sell-side case, total welfare takes into account the 
impact of a practice on producers as well as consumers. Moreover, it 
reflects effects on consumers in other markets as well as consumers in the 
relevant market.  Consider a merger that will raise prices in the relevant 
market but also reduce costs significantly.  Such a transaction will plainly 
harm consumers in the relevant market.  But it will also benefit the owners 
of the merging firms, who will gain both from the higher prices that they 
charge and the lower costs that they realize.  Further, these cost savings will 
free up resources formerly committed to the relevant market, allowing other 
products in the economy to be made more cheaply, benefiting consumers in 
other markets.115  A total welfare standard reflects all these effects, not just 
the impact on consumers in the relevant market.  From the perspective of 
society as a whole, therefore, total welfare is arguably the superior goal. 
The problem is that the total welfare standard ignores the transfer of 
wealth from consumers to producers.116  Yet that transfer is objectionable 
on two grounds.  It may have an adverse distributional impact, increasing 
the unequal dispersion of wealth in the country—a particularly sensitive 
issue at the moment.117  But more importantly, the transfer is exploitative:  
 
 115. See Blair & Sokol, supra note 111, at 484–85 (“The sellers’ costs fall because fewer 
of society’s scarce resources are needed to produce the output being sold.  These resources 
are then available to produce goods and services in other markets.  The consumer benefits 
flowing from these cost savings may be diffused throughout the economy, but they exist 
nonetheless.”); Meese, supra note 3, at 2237–39 (“[C]ost reductions [from a merger] will 
also manifest themselves as resources freed up for other possible uses. . . .  As a result, firms 
in other markets will employ more such inputs, increasing their own output as a result . . . .  
Moreover, output increases in other markets will presumably reduce prices in such markets, 
thereby increasing the welfare of consumers in such markets.”). 
 116. The transfer is ignored because the loss to consumers is offset, dollar for dollar, by 
the gain to the merging firms, leaving total surplus unaffected. 
 117. See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS:  HOW 
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 
(2010); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (2007); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE 
 2454 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
like robbery, it is a form of coerced taking.  The merger would enable the 
merging firms to acquire market power they would not otherwise have, use 
that power to force consumers to pay higher prices, and thereby extract 
consumers’ wealth without providing them with countervailing benefits.  
Such exploitation is widely regarded as unfair. 
To be sure, if a practice did increase total welfare, then in principle this 
taking could be avoided.  Those who gain from the practice—producers in 
the relevant market and consumers in other markets—could compensate 
those who are hurt—consumers in the relevant market—and still come out 
ahead.  If such compensation were provided and consumers in the relevant 
market were fully protected, there would be no need for a consumer 
protection (or small supplier protection) standard.  Consumers and small 
suppliers would be insulated from harm by the combination of a total 
welfare standard and compensation.  But compensation is costly to provide, 
whether it is accomplished through retrospective lawsuits designed to make 
consumers whole or prospective injunctions designed to prevent consumer 
harm in the first place.  Indeed, prospective injunctions would represent a 
type of price regulation.  If firms were allowed to adopt practices that 
promoted total welfare, so long as they did not harm their customers, firms 
would have to offer prices and other terms that were at least as beneficial to 
their customers as they would have offered in the absence of the practices.  
Policing that requirement over time, as costs, demand, and technology 
change, would involve courts in the kind of detailed and counterproductive 
oversight associated with price regulation.118 
It is unlikely, therefore, that antitrust policy would actually attempt to 
ensure that consumers were never hurt by a practice that increased total 
welfare.  Instead, under a total welfare standard, practices that harm 
consumers in the relevant market would be allowed so long as aggregate 
welfare increased.  And under the conventional calculation, that would be 
determined by comparing the increase in producer surplus to the reduction 
in consumer surplus.  That method, however, ignores a significant 
component of total welfare:  the utility or satisfaction that people derive 
from the perception that the legal system is fair and, in particular, from the 
perception that it protects consumers from exploitation at the hands of firms 
that have gained market power illegitimately.  If this “taste” for fairness—
for the avoidance of anticompetitive exploitation—were included in the 
total welfare calculation, as it should be, a total welfare standard would 
move significantly closer to a consumer and small supplier protection 
standard. 
 
PRICE OF INEQUALITY:  HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012); see 
also ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 320 (noting that in the years following the 
Civil War, when the trusts were being formed, “competition gave way to monopoly, and 
wealth inequality rapidly increased”). 
 118. See Baker, supra note 105, at 2178 n.11 (“A robust tax and transfer system could 
prevent consumer losses.  But with respect to the consumer harm from antitrust violations, 
that is more a theoretical possibility than a practical corrective.” (citation omitted)). 
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Although it is seldom recognized, there is no doubt that a taste for 
fairness, like any other preference, should be part of the total welfare 
calculus.  The best known proponents of the view that legal standards 
should be based on total welfare, Professors Kaplow and Shavell, state that 
“any factor that influences individuals’ well-being is relevant under welfare 
economics, and a taste for fairness is no different in this respect from a taste 
for a tangible good or for anything else.”119  They explain:  “The notion of 
well-being used in welfare economics is comprehensive in nature.  It 
incorporates in a positive way everything that an individual might 
value.”120  Professors Brock and Obst agree:  “If individuals value 
something, then it is economically valid—indeed, essential—that it be 
explicitly incorporated into an analysis of economic welfare.”121  In short, 
total welfare should include the value that Americans place on avoiding 
wealth transfers that result from anticompetitive behavior.  In evaluating a 
merger that would raise price and reduce costs, therefore, a total welfare 
calculation should examine not only the reduction in consumer surplus and 
the increase in producer surplus that would result from the merger but also 
the dissatisfaction that the American people would experience if the merger 
were allowed and consumers in the relevant market were exploited by the 
merged firm. 
As Kaplow and Shavell emphasize, the economic value of this 
dissatisfaction is an empirical matter.122  While there does not appear to be 
any direct evidence, there is considerable indirect evidence.  Protecting 
consumers and small suppliers from anticompetitive exploitation is the 
dominant objective in both the legislative histories and the recent case law, 
and it undergirds the current popular and political support for antitrust 
enforcement.123  This does not prove that consumer protection and small 
supplier protection are so important that they essentially eliminate any 
difference between a total welfare standard and a consumer and small 
supplier protection standard.  But it does indicate that many people would 
not want a legal system that allows firms to overcharge their customers or 
underpay their small suppliers, so long as the practices that made this 
possible enlarge the total surplus in the relevant market.124  It also indicates 
 
 119. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 11–12 (2002). 
 120. Id. at 18; see also id. at 21 (“[An] individual might derive pleasure from knowing 
that vicious criminals receive their just desserts (independent of the anticipated effects of 
punishment on the incidence of crime) or that legal rules reflect a favored conception of 
fairness.  In such cases, satisfying the principle of fairness enhances the individual’s well-
being, just as would satisfying his preference for wine.”). 
 121. James W. Brock & Norman P. Obst, Market Concentration, Economic Welfare, and 
Antitrust Policy, 9 J. INDUS. COMPETITION & TRADE 65, 69 (2007). 
 122. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 119, at 12 (“[T]he welfare economic significance of 
a notion of fairness depends directly on the strength of individuals’ actual tastes for it and is 
thus an entirely empirical issue.”). 
 123. See supra Part I.A–C. 
 124. Cf. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 439–40 (2001) (“Citizens 
and legislators may rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate some loss in economic 
efficiency in order to deter what they consider morally offensive conduct.” (quoting Marc 
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that, at a minimum, the total welfare standard must incorporate the value 
that Americans place on fair pricing.  And incorporating that value into the 
total welfare calculus would increase the difficulties of administering it.125 
B.  The Exceptionalism of Section 2 
Professor Meese has argued that section 2 of the Sherman Act is an 
exception from the other provisions of the major antitrust laws.126  Its goal, 
unlike the aim of the other provisions, is total welfare.127  The main pillars 
of this argument, however, are inadequate to support that conclusion.  First, 
section 2’s safe harbor for superior performance does not show that the 
overarching goal of section 2 is total welfare.  The safe harbor is equally 
consistent with a desire to encourage conduct that is likely to benefit 
consumers.  Second, while some cases do say that the objective of section 2 
is economic efficiency, other cases—and in recent years, most other 
cases—indicate that the overarching aim is consumer protection.  In 
addition, there is no good reason and no direct support in the legislative 
history for the view that Congress passed most of the major antitrust 
 
Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice:  Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1393, 1450 (1993))). 
 125. One attraction of a total welfare standard is that it gives more weight to gains in 
productive efficiency than a consumer protection standard, and these gains tend to benefit 
consumers in other markets. See supra note 111.  As a result, elevating consumer protection 
over total welfare tends to favor consumers in the relevant market over consumers in other 
markets.  One reason to do so, of course, is the normative importance of protecting 
consumers in the relevant market from exploitation at the hands of firms that have acquired 
market power illegitimately.  Another reason is the difficulty of determining how much 
consumers in other markets would benefit from an increase in productive efficiency in the 
relevant market.  Price reductions in other markets depend on the nature and extent of the 
resources that flow into them and the supply and demand elasticities in those markets, and 
none of these factors is easy to measure. 
  To be sure, there may be cases in which consumers in other markets would clearly 
gain more than consumers in the relevant market would lose.  It may be plain, for example, 
that the challenged conduct would generate major increases in productive efficiency yet 
hardly raise prices in the relevant market.  But that is no more a decisive objection to a 
consumer protection standard than the reverse case is a fatal objection to a total welfare 
standard—the case in which a small gain in productive efficiency accompanies a major price 
increase. See supra note 14 (describing a joint venture that would enhance total welfare, 
even though it would raise the price of the venture’s output by 300 percent, because it would 
lower manufacturing costs 1 percent).  Whatever standard is chosen, antitrust law would 
have to resolve such extreme cases—cases in which there is a small gain in the preferred 
value and a large reduction in the competing value.  Under either standard, courts might 
want to create an exception for the extreme cases. See Jonathan B. Baker, Competition 
Policy As a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 520 n.137 (2006) (“[A]ntitrust should 
seek to protect consumers [in the relevant market] except when the aggregate efficiency 
costs of doing so would be large.”).  But in order to preserve clear and administrable rules of 
law, those exceptions should be highly limited, if they are allowed at all. 
 126. Meese, supra note 16. 
 127. Meese acknowledges that the apparent purpose of section 1 is the protection of 
consumers in the relevant market or, as he puts it, purchaser welfare. See id. at 733 (“The 
balancing test that courts employ under section 1 of the Act at least purports to condemn 
restraints that reduce purchaser welfare.”); id. at 735 (referring to “section 1’s seeming 
reliance on a purchaser welfare standard”). 
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provisions to protect consumers and small suppliers but enacted section 2 to 
promote total welfare. 
1.  The Safe Harbor for Superior Performance 
It is bedrock section 2 law that a firm may gain a monopoly through 
superior performance, whether such performance involves inventing a 
better product, improving efficiency and then charging lower prices, or 
otherwise outcompeting rivals.  In the legislative debates, as noted above, 
Senator Hoar stated that “a man who merely by superior skill and 
intelligence . . . got the whole business because nobody could do it as well 
as he could was not a monopolist.”128  Subsequent cases have affirmed this 
principle, declaring, for example, that a firm may lawfully obtain a 
monopoly through competition on the merits,129 superior skill,130 or 
competition based on efficiency.131  There is no doubt, in other words, that 
Congress and the courts have established a safe harbor for monopoly power 
acquired or maintained through desirable conduct.  The question is whether 
that safe harbor represents an exception from the consumer protection 
standard that animates the other major antitrust provisions or whether, 
instead, the safe harbor itself serves consumer interests. 
Meese argues that the safe harbor reflects a preference for total welfare 
because it permits an “efficient monopolist”:  a firm that gains monopoly 
power by means of “above-cost pricing that falls below competitors’ prices 
(due perhaps to economies of scale) and that drives less efficient firms from 
the marketplace, thereby empowering the monopolist to raise prices.”132  It 
is true that such conduct, which creates monopoly power through superior 
efficiency, is likely to increase total welfare.  It will reduce the costs of 
producing the relevant product, and that increase in productive efficiency is 
likely to outweigh the reduction in allocative efficiency caused by the 
monopoly pricing.  After all, the high prices do not occur until after the firm 
has attained market dominance. 
But while such conduct is likely to increase total welfare, it is also likely 
to benefit consumers in many cases.  Purchasers in the relevant market 
benefit directly from the low prices that the firm charges when it passes on 
 
 128. 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (1890). 
 129. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 
1953), (distinguishing conduct that furthers the “dominance of a particular firm” and 
“unnecessarily exclude[s] actual and potential competition” from “competition based on pure 
merit”), aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
 130. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(noting that some firms may gain a monopoly “merely by virtue of . . . superior skill, 
foresight and industry” but refusing to condemn such behavior because the monopoly would 
be “the resultant of those very forces which it is [the Sherman Act’s] prime object to 
foster”). 
 131. Aspen Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (“If a 
firm has been ‘attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,’ it is fair to 
characterize its behavior as predatory.” (citing BORK, supra note 18, at 138)). 
 132. Meese, supra note 16, at 681. 
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its superior efficiency and drives out its competitors.  And those low prices 
occur first in time, which means they get the greatest weight in any 
calculation of the present discounted value of the firm’s conduct.  While 
consumers are harmed when the firm attains a monopoly, the extent of that 
harm depends on the degree and duration of the price elevation.  If the price 
increase is limited in size or does not persist for long, its adverse effects 
would be outweighed by the earlier and later periods of low pricing.  In this 
scenario, consumers may often benefit on balance. 
Without a definitive study of the issue, it is impossible to say with 
confidence that the safe harbor in section 2 is in fact good for consumers.  
But there are several reasons to think that the safe harbor furthers consumer 
interests.  For one, Meese does not contest the proposition.  He recognizes 
that a number of scholars contend, as I do, that the safe harbor is consistent 
with a consumer welfare standard,133 but he does not dispute the accuracy 
of this claim.  Rather, he argues that it “ignores the intellectual roots of the 
safe harbor, which the Harvard School developed and endorsed as a means 
of furthering total welfare and not the welfare of purchasers.”134  That may 
be the case, although Areeda himself rejected the views of the “efficiency 
extremists” and embraced a consumer protection standard after Lande 
published his classic article.135  But whatever its genesis, the safe harbor is 
now seen by most courts as a device for advancing the interests of 
consumers.136  Second, it is difficult to formulate legal standards that better 
promote the long-term interests of consumers than the existing safe harbor.  
If that is true, as I indicate below, it is hard to conclude that the safe harbor 
can only be explained by a preference for total welfare.  Finally, it is clear 
that consumers often benefit from the safe harbor when the superior 
performance takes the form of innovation.  When a new product is brought 
to the market, purchasers are frequently better off, even if the firm charges a 
supracompetitive price, because they have the option of purchasing the 
existing product if they do not like the new offering.137 
 
 133. See id. at 721 (citing Jonathan A. Jacobsen & Scott A. Sher, “No Economic Sense” 
Makes No Sense for Exclusive Dealing, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 779, 781–83 (2006)); Mark S. 
Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct:  Section 2, the Rule of Reason, and the Unifying 
Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 465 (2006). 
 134. Meese, supra note 16, at 721. 
 135. See supra note 19. 
 136. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 137. If, instead, the firm withdraws its existing product when it introduces a new one, a 
presumption of consumer benefit may not be warranted.  But, in that case, it may be equally 
inappropriate to characterize the new product introduction as superior performance. See 
Press Release, FTC, FTC Files Amicus Brief Explaining That Pharmaceutical “Product 
Hopping” Can Be the Basis for an Antitrust Lawsuit (Nov. 27, 2012), available at 
www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/11/doryx.shtm.  The press release explains: 
Brand name pharmaceutical companies can try to obstruct generic competitors and 
preserve monopoly profits on a patented drug by making modest reformulations 
that offer little or no therapeutic advantages, a tactic known as “product-switching” 
or “product hopping” . . . .  Prior to facing generic competition, a brand drug 
company can, for example, simply withdraw its original product, forcing 
consumers to switch to the reformulated brand drug and enabling the branded 
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In comparing a total welfare standard to a consumer welfare standard, 
Meese sometimes misstates the consumer welfare standard.  He asserts:  
“Under . . . the purchaser welfare standard, courts should ban all conduct 
that creates market power and thus raises prices that parties pay in the 
relevant market.”138  As Lande and I have indicated, however, a consumer 
protection standard would not ban all conduct that creates market power; it 
would prohibit conduct that creates market power without justification.139  
Its aim is to stop firms from obtaining market power without earning it—
that is, without providing consumers with compensating benefits.  This is 
the essence of anticompetitive conduct:  it creates market power but does 
not provide consumers or small suppliers with offsetting benefits that 
justify the conduct. 
Nor does the fact that the safe harbor is a bright-line rule—a rule of per 
se legality for conduct within the safe harbor—mean that the safe harbor 
can only be warranted by a total welfare goal.  As existing law makes clear, 
a consumer and small supplier protection standard also employs bright-line 
rules or other devices to simplify antitrust litigation and enhance its 
deterrence value.  The difference is that, under such a standard, the aim is to 
advance the long-term interests of consumers and small suppliers, not 
promote total welfare even when their interests are harmed.  Professor 
Elhauge explains: 
 The fact that antitrust law embraces a consumer welfare standard does 
not mean that courts must assess consumer welfare effects on a case-by-
case basis.  Often they use rules, like the quasi per se rule [for tying], that 
identify conduct likely to harm consumer welfare.  It just means that 
consumer welfare is the ultimate metric used to design antitrust laws, 
whether they take the form of rules or standards.140 
 
company to keep its market exclusivity and preventing consumers from obtaining 
the benefits of generic competition. 
This “product-hop” may succeed despite the fact that consumers would not likely 
choose the new product.  As the amicus brief states:  “In the pharmaceutical 
industry . . . the success of a product-switching scheme does not depend on 
whether consumers prefer the reformulated version of the product over the 
original, or whether the reformulated version provides any medical benefit.” 
Instead of making a choice, consumers are denied a real choice. 
Id. 
 138. Meese, supra note 16, at 669; see also id. at 662 (“Under [the] ‘purchaser welfare’ 
standard, the acquisition of monopoly due to economies of scale would be unlawful 
whenever purchasers in the relevant market pay high prices.”). 
 139. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 53, at 242 (“Congress’ principal objective . . . 
was to prevent firms from acquiring or maintaining market power without justification and 
then using that power to raise prices to consumers.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 192 
(“The fundamental goal of antitrust . . . is to protect consumers in the relevant market from 
anticompetitive behavior that exploits them—that unfairly transfers their wealth to firms 
with market power—not to increase the total wealth of society.” (emphasis added)); id. at 
193 (“In both sell-side and buy-side cases, . . . the ultimate goal is the same—preventing 
firms that have unfairly acquired power from exploiting their trading partners, buyers or 
sellers.” (emphasis added)). 
 140. Elhauge, supra note 5, at 437 n.104.  It is incorrect, therefore, to claim that “embrace 
of a purchaser welfare standard would entail application of a consumer welfare balancing 
 2460 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Mark Popofsky concurs: 
Courts select the legal test that assertedly maximizes long-term consumer 
welfare or, put in the language of balancing, is on balance best for 
consumers.  The appropriate test—the level of intervention—does not 
necessarily ask whether the conduct produces net anticompetitive effects 
in a particular case.  Rather, courts determine at the step of selecting the 
appropriate legal test whether the proposed test itself is better for 
consumers than other liability tests.141 
Under a consumer and small supplier protection standard, courts can and 
do use bright-line tests, presumptions, and safe harbors to create a legal 
system that serves the interests of consumers in sell-side cases and small 
suppliers in buy-side cases, taking into account the costs of administering 
the system and its impact on deterrence.  The legal rules that emerge may 
not always be optimal, but the departures generally reflect, especially in 
recent years, a concern with deterring procompetitive behavior rather than 
an expressed intent to promote total welfare.142  Indeed, the safe harbor for 
superior performance is itself based on the same concern:  a desire to 
encourage competitive success and to protect firms that have won the 
competitive race from antitrust liability.143  And this goal plainly serves 
consumer interests, since those who win the race have provided their 
customers with the best combination of prices, products, and service 
 
test [under which] courts would balance any benefits produced by a challenged practice 
against its harms.” Meese, supra note 16, at 736.  Elsewhere, Meese recognizes this, noting 
that “administrative costs are real,” and that “a rule may seek to implement a particular 
normative standard without actually condemning every instance of conduct that offends that 
standard in the real world.” Id. at 671. 
 141. Popofsky, supra note 133, at 448; see also id. at 481 (“For the conduct at issue, 
courts attempt to select the liability test that minimizes error and legal process costs and 
thereby makes consumers in the long run better off relative to applying other legal tests to 
that conduct.”); id. at 465 (explaining that when courts create a safe harbor, they “reason[] 
that engaging in a case-specific assessment of net effects on consumers in these 
circumstances is fraught with difficulty, will undermine ex ante incentives to compete, and 
thus is not in consumers’ best interests”). 
 142. See infra Part II.B.2 (analyzing cases).  Moreover, it is difficult to develop better 
rules when they have to be justified not only in terms of their conceptual soundness but also 
in light of their administrability and deterrence effects.  I have suggested, for example, a new 
legal standard to control above-cost pricing, a standard that would combine a consumer 
welfare test with a no-economic-sense defense. See John B. Kirkwood, Controlling Above-
Cost Predation:  An Alternative to Weyerhaeuser and Brooke Group, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 
369 (2008).  It is not obvious, however, that this standard would be no more burdensome to 
administer than the current test for predatory pricing, yet produce a better balance of false 
positives and false negatives.  While there is good reason to believe that it would meet both 
criteria, the only way to know is to try it.  The point is that even a relatively conservative 
legal rule, like the current test for predatory pricing, may actually be the best way to protect 
consumers.  It is unnecessary to resort to a total welfare goal to explain the test. 
 143. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (“The 
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he 
wins.”); Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 707 (1975) (“[D]enying monopoly 
profits to those whose power was obtained by superior skill, foresight, and industry could 
eliminate the primary incentive to develop such competitive skill.”). 
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offered.  In short, one cannot reason from the existence of the safe harbor to 
the conclusion that the fundamental aim of section 2—the objective that 
should prevail in cases of conflict—is economic efficiency rather than 
consumer and small supplier protection. 
2.  The Case Law 
The case law has not endorsed the view that the overarching goal of 
section 2 is total welfare.  While the cases firmly recognize the safe harbor 
for superior performance, and a significant number describe the safe harbor 
as protecting competition on the merits or competition based on efficiency, 
no case in the last two decades has declared that the aim of section 2 is 
economic efficiency rather than consumer protection.  Nor has any case 
allowed conduct that would harm the long-term interests of consumers on 
the ground that it would enhance total welfare.  Today, most decisions that 
address the ultimate aim of section 2 describe it in terms of consumer 
protection. 
In rejecting a refusal-to-deal claim under section 2, for example, the 
Tenth Circuit stated that to force the defendant to deal with the plaintiff 
“well might deter future investments of the sort . . . made in this case—and 
thus to undermine, rather than promote, investment, innovation, and 
consumer choice.”144  The court also observed that the plaintiff 
might be better off with such a shared monopoly, but there’s no guarantee 
consumers would be.  Whatever injury he may have suffered, then, it is 
not one the antitrust laws protect because “a producer’s loss is no concern 
of the antitrust laws, which protect consumers from suppliers rather than 
suppliers from each other.”145 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit declared that section 2 should be interpreted 
so that it does not “punish economic behavior that benefits consumers.”146 
The court adopted a cost-based test for bundled discounts because it thought 
that it was “the course safer for consumers and our competitive 
economy.”147  This is especially significant because the court recognized 
that a more open-ended test, like that adopted in LePage’s Inc. v. 3M,148 
could “protect a less efficient competitor.”149  Yet the court’s reluctance to 
protect less efficient rivals was not based on a desire to promote total 
welfare.  The court stated that such protection would come “at the expense 
of consumer welfare”150 and noted that the LePage’s standard “risks 
curtailing price competition and a method of pricing beneficial to 
 
 144. Four Corners Nephrology Assoc. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 1216, 
1224 (10th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 145. Id. at 1226 (emphasis added) (quoting Stamatakis Indus., Inc. v. King, 965 F.2d 469, 
471 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 146. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 903 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 147. Id. 
 148. 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussed infra at notes 154–59). 
 149. Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 899. 
 150. Id. 
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customers.”151  Likewise, in United States v. AMR Corp.,152 another section 
2 case evaluating low pricing, the Tenth Circuit refused to adopt a short run 
profit sacrifice test because it “could lead to a strangling of competition, as 
it would condemn nearly all output expansions, and harm to consumers.”153 
In LePage’s, the plaintiff was in fact a less efficient competitor,154 and 
the court, if it had cared more about total welfare than the welfare of 
consumers, would have allowed 3M to use bundled discounts to drive 
LePage’s from the market.  But the Third Circuit anchored its analysis in 
consumer protection, not economic efficiency.  The court objected to 3M’s 
pricing scheme because it was likely to force consumers to pay higher 
prices155 and stated that 3M could justify the scheme only if it could show 
that it enhanced consumer welfare.156  The court concluded that 3M had not 
done so.  It realized few if any cost savings through its rebates and, thus, 
could not show that its price cuts were cost justified.157  In the court’s view, 
3M’s motivation must therefore have been predatory:  “There is 
considerable evidence in the record that 3M entered the private-label market 
only to ‘kill it.’”158  One can quarrel with this diagnosis,159 but it is difficult 
to say that the Third Circuit viewed the purpose of section 2 as enhancing 
total welfare. 
 
 151. Id. (quoting LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 179 (Greenberg, J., dissenting)). 
 152. 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 153. Id. at 1119; see also id. at 1118 (stating that a short-run profit-sacrifice test would 
“often result in injury to the consumer”).  In United States v. Dentsply Int’l, 399 F.3d 181 
(3d Cir. 2005), a section 2 case challenging exclusive dealing, the Third Circuit emphasized 
the adverse effect on consumers, not total welfare, of the defendant’s monopoly power:  
“The picture is one of a manufacturer that sets prices with little concern for its competitors 
. . . .  The results have been favorable to Dentsply, but of no benefit to consumers.” Id. at 
191. 
 154. LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 177 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (“LePage’s economist 
conceded that LePage’s is not as efficient a tape producer as 3M.”). 
 155. Id. at 162–63 (“3M’s exclusionary conduct not only impeded LePage’s ability to 
compete, but also it harmed competition itself . . . .  The District Court recognized this in its 
opinion, when it said:  ‘The jury could reasonably infer that 3M’s planned elimination of the 
lower priced private label tape, as well as the lower priced Highland brand, would channel 
consumer selection to the higher priced Scotch brand.’ . . . .  The District Court thus 
observed, ‘the record amply reflects that 3M’s rebate programs did not benefit the ultimate 
consumer.’” (quoting LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, No. Civ. A. 97-3983, 2000 WL 280350, at *7 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2000))). 
 156. Id. at 163 (“In general, a business justification is valid if it relates directly or 
indirectly to the enhancement of consumer welfare.” (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman 
Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1183 (1st Cir. 1994))). 
 157. Id. at 164. 
 158. Id. 
 159. The most plausible alternative explanation is that 3M adopted the rebates because 
they increased its short run profits, eliminating any need for the company to raise prices 
later.  The dissent notes that 3M continued to cover its costs, even after the rebates. Id. at 173 
(“LePage’s did not demonstrate that 3M’s pricing was below cost (a point that is not in 
dispute).”) (Greenberg, J., dissenting).  As a result, if the rebates led to a substantial increase 
in 3M’s sales, they would have raised its short-term profits. See id. at 179 (“3M’s pricing 
structure and bundled rebates were not contrary to its economic interests, as they likely 
increased its sales.”). 
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In United States v. Microsoft,160 the most famous section 2 case in recent 
years, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the defendant’s conduct should be 
evaluated under the rule of reason and formulated that standard in terms of 
effects on consumers, not total welfare.161  The court stated that the plaintiff 
in a section 2 case must demonstrate that the monopolist’s conduct had an 
anticompetitive effect:  “That is, it must harm the competitive process and 
thereby harm consumers.”162  If the defendant establishes a procompetitive 
justification—some “form of competition on the merits,”163 such as “greater 
efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal164—the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive 
benefit.”165  The court did not say that proof of “competition on the merits” 
or “greater efficiency” would absolve the defendant of liability.  To the 
contrary, the plaintiff may still prevail by showing that the harm caused by 
defendant’s conduct exceeded its benefits.  More important, the court did 
not indicate that the objective of the inquiry changes during the course of 
the litigation—that the plaintiff must show harm to consumers in order to 
establish its initial burden but then must show harm to total welfare to 
discharge its ultimate burden.166 
Like many other cases, the Second Circuit’s decision in Trans Sport, Inc. 
v. Starter Sportswear, Inc.,167 recognizes the safe harbor for superior 
performance.  But unlike numerous other cases, Trans Sport addresses the 
ultimate aim of the safe harbor.  According to the court, its goal is to protect 
successful firms in order to advance the interests of consumers:  “As we 
have consistently made clear, ‘[s]uccess alone is not enough to sustain an 
antitrust claim or the antitrust laws would have their greatest impact on the 
most efficient entrepreneurs and would injure rather than protect 
consumers.’”168 
Many other cases acknowledge the safe harbor or state that exclusionary 
conduct can be saved from section 2 liability by proof of a business 
justification but do not discuss whether the conduct that merits the safe 
harbor or qualifies as a business justification must advance total welfare or 
the welfare of consumers.169  In contrast, in Brooke Group, the Supreme 
 
 160. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 161. See id. at 58–59. 
 162. Id. at 58. 
 163. Id. at 59. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. The court did indicate, earlier in its opinion, that “exclusionary acts . . . reduce social 
welfare, and competitive acts . . . increase it.” Id. at 58.  But when the court set forth the rule 
of reason that governs the legality of conduct under section 2, it did not mention total 
welfare. 
 167. 964 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 168. Id. at 189 (quoting U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 
1359 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
 169. For recent cases recognizing the safe harbor, see W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., 
Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 108 (3d Cir. 2010); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 
F.3d 297, 308 (3rd Cir. 2007).  For cases indicating that a legitimate business justification 
will protect conduct from section 2 liability, see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
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Court linked the safe harbor and “competition on the merits” to the interests 
of consumers in the relevant market.170  As noted above,171 the Court 
refused to condemn below-cost pricing in the absence of proof of 
recoupment, even though such pricing could reduce allocative efficiency 
because it lowers prices, raises consumer welfare, and generally is a “boon 
to consumers.”172  The Court also explained that when a firm excludes a 
rival through above-cost pricing, that may reflect “the lower cost structure 
of the alleged predator, and so represent[] competition on the merits.”173  
But the Court did not say that such competition on the merits should be 
preserved because it increases productive efficiency and enhances total 
welfare.  Instead, the goal of antitrust policy in this area is to provide 
consumers with “the benefits of lower prices.”174  Thus, even though 
above-cost price cuts may harm consumers, the Court stressed that they 
cannot be practically remedied without discouraging too much price 
cutting,175 putting the emphasis on consumer impact, not efficiency.176 
In the last two decades, in short, the case law under section 2 continues to 
uphold the safe harbor for superior performance or competition on the 
merits, but when judges have attempted to explain the rationale for this safe 
harbor, they have explained it in terms of consumer protection, not total 
welfare.  While some decisions from an earlier era associated the safe 
harbor with Bork’s book or the Areeda-Turner treatise177—both of which 
 
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 
472 U.S. 585, 602–05 (1985).  None of these cases, however, addresses the ultimate purpose 
of either the safe harbor or the business justification defense. 
 170. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
 171. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 172. Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 224. 
 173. Id. at 223. 
 174. Id. at 224. 
 175. See id. at 223 (above-cost price cuts are “beyond the practical ability of a judicial 
tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price cutting”). 
 176. In Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), Justice Scalia also 
emphasized customer benefit when he explained that compelling monopolists to “share the 
source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, 
since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in . . . 
economically beneficial facilities.” Id. at 407–08.  He described an economically beneficial 
facility as “an infrastructure that renders [firms] uniquely suited to serve their customers.” 
Id. at 407. 
 177. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 
nn.32–33 (1985) (citing BORK, supra note 18, at 138 and PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. 
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 626b (1978)).  Despite these citations, the Court’s analysis gave 
much more weight to consumer protection than total welfare:  it emphasized the adverse 
impact on consumers of the defendant’s unwillingness to continue the four-mountain pass 
and never asked whether that decision might have promoted economic efficiency by 
reducing free riding by the plaintiff. See George L. Priest & Jonathan Lewinsohn, Aspen 
Skiing:  Product Differentiation and Thwarting Free Riding As Monopolization, in 
ANTITRUST STORIES 229 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007).  Indeed, Priest and 
Lewinsohn believe that Aspen Skiing applied a consumer welfare standard and equated the 
efficiency of a practice with its impact on consumers: 
The Court sought in Aspen Skiing to apply the consumer welfare standard to 
Section 2 refusal to deal claims.  According to the analysis, where a distribution 
practice is identified as efficient—which is to say, beneficial to consumers—and a 
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advocated economic efficiency as the overarching goal—the emphasis on 
aggregate efficiency has largely disappeared from recent cases.  They 
remain concerned (perhaps overly concerned) with false positives, but this 
concern appears to be rooted in a desire to protect and encourage behavior, 
like price cutting and innovation, that benefits consumers, not a desire to 
further total welfare.  In consequence, the case law under section 2 is now 
broadly consistent with the case law under section 1 of the Sherman Act 
and section 7 of the Clayton Act, both of which assign preeminence to 
consumer and small supplier protection. 
3.  The Consistency of Section 2 with the Other Antitrust Laws 
The overarching goal of section 7 of the Clayton Act, as interpreted by 
the courts today, is to protect consumers from higher prices.178  Mergers 
that are likely to lead to overcharges are never excused on the ground that 
they will enhance efficiency and improve total welfare.179  Likewise, the 
ultimate aim of section 1 of the Sherman Act is to protect consumers and 
small suppliers from behavior that injures them.180  It would be odd, given 
these identical goals, if the basic purpose of section 2 were not only 
different but different in a fundamental way—if section 2, unlike section 1 
and section 7, elevated total welfare over consumer and small supplier 
protection. 
Meese does not offer any reason why the fundamental purpose of the 
three major antitrust provisions should diverge.  To the contrary, he appears 
to believe that their goals should be the same, suggesting that courts should 
 
monopolist changes the practice without providing efficiency justifications, a 
Section 2 violation is proved. 
Id. at 252. 
 178. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in Merger Analysis 13 (Univ. of Iowa, Legal 
Studies Research Paper, No. 12-26, 2012), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=194
5964 (“Today there is little dispute about the proposition that the central concern of merger 
policy is to protect consumers from high prices that result from reduced output.”); id. at 14 
(“[C]ourts and enforcers [have] a set of merger concerns that claim broad assent—namely, to 
prevent consumer harm through higher prices.”).  In a buy-side case, the fundamental goal is 
to prevent mergers that are likely to depress the price that suppliers receive below the 
competitive level. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 65, § 12 ex. 24 
(describing a merger to monopsony in the purchase of an agricultural product and indicating 
that it will “depress the price paid to farmers for this product, causing a transfer of wealth 
from farmers to the merged firm and inefficiently reducing supply”). 
 179. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 53, at 225 (quoted supra at note 65); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and Consumer Welfare in Antitrust 4 (Aug. 3, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873463 (“[C]urrent merger 
policy in the United States will generally not recognize a defense that although the merger 
increases the post-merger firm’s market power and produces higher immediate prices, it will 
also produce efficiencies that are greater than the consumer losses.  Rather, it must be shown 
the merger will not result in a price increase at all, even in the short run.”). 
 180. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 178, at 21 (identifying “the one thing that 
antitrust policy cares about most, namely, consumer welfare as measured by price and 
output”); Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 53; Meese, supra note 16, at 720 (stating that 
“under section 1 . . . courts focus on purchaser welfare”). 
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adopt social welfare as the goal of section 1.181  Nor does the legislative 
history or the case law supply any basis for different normative premises.  
To be sure, when Senator Hoar first articulated section 2’s safe harbor for 
superior performance, he cast its rationale in terms of fairness rather than 
welfare and did not state that the safe harbor was needed to protect the 
interests of either consumers or society.182  But, as noted earlier, the 
examples he gave of conduct that would and would not be protected by the 
safe harbor indicate that, if welfare were his concern, he cared more about 
the welfare of consumers than total welfare.183  And this is consistent with 
the orientation of the legislative debates generally.184 Their focus was on 
protecting consumers and small suppliers from anticompetitive conduct—
conduct that takes their wealth without providing offsetting benefits—and 
nowhere did a senator or representative say that such conduct should be 
excused when it increases the efficiency of the economy. 
C.  When High Prices Benefit Consumers 
Professor Orbach has pointed out two situations in which high prices may 
enhance consumer welfare.  The first involves harmful products like 
cigarettes, where high prices, by discouraging consumption, tend to 
increase the well-being of consumers.185  The second involves status goods, 
where high prices, by contributing to the prestige of the product, may raise 
its value for certain consumers.186  In these situations, antitrust enforcement 
may actually reduce the welfare of consumers.187  As explained below, 
however, neither situation requires a reformulation of the fundamental goal 
of antitrust because, as this Article makes clear, it is framed not in terms of 
maximizing consumer welfare but in terms of protecting consumers from 
anticompetitive conduct. 
1.  Harmful Products 
The essence of anticompetitive conduct in a sell-side case is that it 
creates market power and extracts wealth from consumers without 
providing them with compensating benefits.  Under that definition, a cartel 
 
 181. See Meese, supra note 16, at 735–36 (“Perhaps this Article’s conclusions . . . should 
cause courts to reassess their apparent commitment to protecting purchasers instead of 
society in that small subset of cases governed by section 1.”). 
 182. See supra note 37 and accompanying quotation. 
 183. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra notes 18–46 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Orbach, supra note 3, at 152 (“The actual existence of bad [products that are 
harmful for consumers, despite their preference for them] suggests that low prices are not 
always good for consumers.”). 
 186. Id. at 155 (“Some consumers . . . are willing to pay premium prices for certain 
branded goods, as long as these premiums buy them exclusivity and status.”). 
 187. Id. at 152 (“[T]he application of antitrust laws in markets for bads to protect low 
prices is inconsistent with any coherent view of consumer welfare or social welfare.”); id. at 
156 (“[P]resent formulations of the antitrust consumer welfare goal appear to be inconsistent 
with common desires for status and exclusivity.”). 
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of cigarette producers would be engaged in anticompetitive conduct and 
antitrust action that broke up the cartel would advance the fundamental goal 
of antitrust.  Of course, by lowering prices, the antitrust case would 
encourage cigarette consumption and increase the likelihood of individual 
and public health problems, but those adverse effects on consumers and 
taxpayers could be avoided by raising the excise taxes on cigarettes.  The 
potential benefits of a cartel, in other words, could be obtained through 
governmental action and the cartel itself would be unjustified.  Whatever 
benefits it provided could be achieved through a less restrictive alternative.  
Indeed, the alternative is likely to be preferable, since self-interested cartel 
members are less likely than governments to set cigarette prices at the 
optimal level for public health.188 
2.  Status Goods 
Some consumers derive satisfaction from the prestige or status value of 
an item, and the price of the item may add to its status.189  In such cases, 
though, the producer does not engage in anticompetitive conduct when it 
introduces the product or sells it at a premium price.  Rather, the firm is 
attempting to succeed in the marketplace by offering its customers what 
they want:  an expensive status good.  In consequence, if the firm is so 
successful that it achieves monopoly power, it is entitled to the safe harbor 
for superior performance.  That result, however, would not be inconsistent 
with the fundamental goal of antitrust law:  it would further it.  Even though 
the firm has acquired monopoly power, it has provided its customers with a 
new product that they valued at the high price. 
The analysis is more complicated if the firm not only charges a high 
wholesale price for the product but employs resale price maintenance to 
elevate its retail price.  In that case, under the rule of reason applicable to 
vertical restraints,190 the question is whether the vertical price fixing is 
justified—whether, in essence, the firm would be unable to furnish 
equivalent benefits to consumers without the downstream restraint.  If the 
answer is yes, there would be no antitrust liability, and the result would 
 
 188. 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 217b4 (3d ed. 
2006) (“Whether more or less cigarette smoking is healthy or unhealthy is an important 
policy concern, but it is not one that is properly effected through the device of an 
unsupervised cartel agreement.”).  It is possible, of course, that price fixing by a cartel would 
achieve the optimal price level when, for some reason or other, excise taxes had not been set 
high enough.  But this possibility is both too remote and too difficult for a court to evaluate 
to warrant an exception from the current per se ban on price fixing. See Meese, supra note 3, 
at 2234–35 (“[B]oth state and national governments already regulate tobacco quite heavily 
by means of warning labels, public service announcements, outright smoking bans and, most 
importantly, taxes justified on both revenue generation and regulatory grounds.  For all we 
know, cigarettes and other forms of tobacco might be overregulated.  Any court that sought 
to incorporate the reduction in such externalities as part of its evaluation of, say, a cartel of 
cigarette producers would take on a task worthy of the most zealous central planner.”). 
 189. See John B. Kirkwood, Rethinking Antitrust Policy Toward RPM, 55 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 423, 451 (2010). 
 190. See id. at 424. 
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again be consistent with the ultimate goal of antitrust.  Although the resale 
price maintenance might add to the firm’s market power, the practice would 
provide consumers with benefits that could not be achieved in any other 
way. 
CONCLUSION 
The legislative histories of the major antitrust laws, the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts, leave little doubt that there were certain types of conduct that 
Congress wanted to prohibit and other categories that it wanted to protect.  
Congress plainly intended to stop competitors from combining into trusts or 
other arrangements that enhanced their market power and enabled them to 
charge higher prices.  Such conduct, in the view of many senators and 
representatives, was a form of theft, since it allowed the perpetrators to take 
the wealth of consumers and transfer it to themselves.  Likewise, Congress 
wanted to stop the same kind of behavior on the other side of the market—
behavior that forced small suppliers like farmers and ranchers to accept 
prices below the competitive level, enabling powerful buyers to enhance 
their profits at the suppliers’ expense.  At the same time, Congress wanted 
to protect conduct that enhanced competition and benefited consumers and 
small suppliers.  One senator, in a well-known statement, made clear that 
the Sherman Act should not condemn firms that were successful in the 
marketplace because they brought consumers better products or lower 
prices, even if they gained monopoly power as a result.  It would be unfair 
to the firm, and harmful to its customers, if such desirable behavior were 
punished.  But Congress’s appreciation for efficient conduct did not extend 
to conduct that reduced costs but raised prices, since such conduct would 
diminish the well-being of consumers in the relevant market, not enhance it. 
While Congress never expressed the overarching principle that ties these 
objectives together, that principle follows from the language and legislative 
histories of the antitrust statutes.  These sources imply that Congress’s most 
fundamental goal—its predominant purpose—was to protect consumers and 
small suppliers from anticompetitive conduct—conduct that creates market 
power, extracts wealth from consumers or small suppliers, and fails to 
provide them with compensating benefits. 
The case law has now largely adopted this understanding.  In the last two 
decades, it has almost completely abandoned any concern with protecting 
small business or reducing the overall concentration of power in society.  
Today, the courts recognize that the fundamental goal of antitrust is 
economic, not populist.  With few exceptions, moreover, the courts now 
view that economic goal as protecting consumers and small suppliers from 
anticompetitive conduct, not increasing economic efficiency.  While judges 
put great stress on not deterring procompetitive conduct, the kind of 
conduct they want to shield—to the extent that can be discerned—is 
conduct that is likely to benefit consumers and small suppliers, not conduct 
that will promote total welfare at their expense.  Courts rarely express a 
desire to advance total welfare and have never excused a practice that 
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caused overall harm to consumers or small suppliers in the relevant market 
on the ground that it would increase the efficiency of the economy. 
This broad agreement on the ultimate objective of antitrust enforcement 
does not mean that every existing antitrust doctrine is ideal.  Some legal 
standards, particularly in the area of exclusionary conduct by dominant 
firms, may underdeter anticompetitive conduct.  But there is now a general 
understanding of what the ultimate aim of an antitrust legal standard ought 
to be. 
The antitrust laws enjoy extensive popular and political support because 
this is their fundamental goal.  Congress and the American people want an 
antitrust system that protects consumers and small suppliers from 
exploitative behavior—behavior that takes their wealth without providing 
them with offsetting benefits.  As commentators and social scientists have 
noted, many people regard such exploitation as unfair. 
A legal system with this overarching objective is also easier to 
administer.  It is less complicated and less time consuming to pursue a 
single target in sell-side cases and a comparable target in buy-side cases 
than to determine whether total welfare would improve, even when 
consumers or small suppliers are likely to be hurt.  The antitrust goal with 
the widest support, in short, is the goal of protecting consumers and small 
suppliers from anticompetitive conduct.191 
 
 191. This Article has emphasized the economic benefits of an antitrust system that 
protects consumers and small suppliers from anticompetitive conduct. Such a system also 
has political benefits.  By reducing unwarranted concentrations of power, it keeps political 
institutions more open, which in turn helps to preserve free markets.  For a discussion of this 
virtuous circle, see ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 323–24; see also Harry First 
& Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543 (2013); 
Eleanor M. Fox, Against Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2157 (2013). 
